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
“RELUCTANT LEARNERS”

EDITORIAL

Perhaps we had better clear up one possible misapprehension before we go any further. As a theme for the first *Hartford Quarterly* of the school year, “Reluctant Learners” might be regarded as casting a reflection upon the enthusiasm with which our student body faces the work of the coming academic year. That is not the reason for choosing it as our theme. If it were, there could hardly be any more justification for using it than for entitling our first number “Reluctant Teachers,” for we are extremely conscious that we return to campus without the inspiration and leadership of President Gettemy. We assure him of our deep affection, and pray that the time of rest prescribed by his doctors will enable him soon to return to give us the benefit of his vision and ministry among us.

Our title is that which was chosen by Canon Kenneth Cragg for the first series of Purdy Lectures given in Holy Week during the past year: “Reluctant Learners: Holy Week through the Centuries.” Dr. Cragg is now Warden of St. Augustine’s College, Canterbury, England, which is the central training centre of the Anglican (Episcopal) Communion. He went to this post after very distinguished service with the Near Eastern Christian Council, and as Professor of Arabic and Islamics in the Kennedy School of Missions. By his books, *The Call of the Minaret* (1956) and *Sandals at the Mosque* (1959), Dr. Cragg has shown himself to be not only in the front rank of scholars in the field of Islamics, but also one of the most perceptive and compassionate participants in the dialogue between Muslims and Christians. It was an honour to have him back on our campus, and it was a benediction to have him during Holy Week.

This issue of the *Quarterly* is particularly devoted to the special interests that have concerned Dr. Cragg—training for the Christian mission in the world, and the ongoing conversation between Christianity and Islam. We include his Purdy Lectures in full, but by happy coincidence we are also able to include the Inaugural Lec-



ture of his friend, Dr. Daud Rahbar, as Visiting Professor of Urdu and Pakistan Studies at the Hartford Seminary Foundation. We also congratulate Dr. Rahbar on his study of Islamic theology, *God of Justice*, that was published earlier during the past academic year (1960) by Brill of Leiden.


By another happy coincidence we celebrate this year the fiftieth anniversary of both the Kennedy School of Missions and *The Muslim World*, both founded as direct results of the 1910 Edinburgh Conference. Miss Flola Shepard, Associate Professor of Linguistics, has written on the last twenty-five years in the history of the K.S.M., and Dr. Elmer Douglas, (who succeeded Dr. Cragg both in the teaching of Arabic and Islamics at Hartford and as Editor of *The Muslim World*), tells us how that far-sighted experiment to explore the frontier between Christianity and Islam began its life.

The story of *The Muslim World* underlines the fact that learning and teaching is never a one-way process. It is true that the declaration of the Christian Gospel to the world must be stated in clear and unambiguous terms, but in the final analysis the primary argument is the spirit that is in Jesus Christ—a spirit that is prepared to listen.

The same thought is illustrated in the history of the K.S.M. in a slightly different form. The world in which we live is forcing us to re-think our whole approach to the training of those who will be engaged in the Christian mission, yet without giving up those standards of comprehension for differing cultures and of technical excellence, for which the Kennedy School of Missions was founded and which it has persistently maintained. As we face in Dr. Cragg's lectures the reluctance of all men to face the Cross, we recognize

that the reluctance which we experience there at the deepest level, is echoed in our own unreadiness to accept the changes that have come upon us. We are having to learn, albeit reluctantly. Indeed, perhaps there is no body of people to which Dr. Cragg's title can be applied with more appropriateness at the present time than to the Christian Church.






Kenneth Cragg

RELUCTANT LEARNERS: HOLY WEEK AND THE CENTURIES*

Kenneth Cragg

Canon Kenneth Cragg is Warden of St. Augustine's College, Canterbury, England, and was formerly Professor of Arabic and Islamics in the Hartford Seminary Foundation.



1. THE LESSON

We take a point of departure from the story of Alice in Wonderland, with a quotation on the subject of time. The Mad Hatter and Alice are talking together, and Alice says: "I know that I have to beat time when I learn music." The Mad Hatter replies: "He won't stand beating. . . . But if you only keep on good terms with him, he'll do almost anything you like. For instance, suppose it were nine o'clock in the morning, and time to begin lessons, you only have to whisper a hint to time, and round goes the clock in a twinkling—half past one! And time for dinner!" "That would be grand certainly," says Alice thoughtfully, "but then I shouldn't be hungry for it, should I?"

Time is truly a strange thing and has these different dimensions. The Greeks in their wisdom had two names for it: *chronos* and *kairos*. The former is time as measure, while *kairos* is, roughly, time as meaning. There is time as a 'when' and time as a 'what'. Time-*chronos* makes chronology: it gives events a date. But time as *kairos* takes events as significant. It is of course in this second realm that Biblical time mostly moves, as in such phrases as: "the

*The pages that follow are reproduced and edited by the author from the spoken word.

day of the Lord:" "the hour is come." Here time is not a quantity: rather it is a quality; significant not for 'when' it is, in terms of something in a series like Friday following Thursday, or lasting the duration that sand takes to drop through an hour-glass, not something essentially to be measured as a quantity, but something known and experienced as a quality. Clearly, we cannot honor a loved name in the history of an institution merely by setting aside four hours of lectures in which to do so. We have, so to speak, to be hungry or it is not dinner time. Thus the proper hope of this period of lectures would be to focus attention on the sort of hunger that ought to belong to us when we remember with gratitude our colleagues and their leadership.

But similarly, this is Holy Week, whose days lead into the fullness of Good Friday. We cannot enter into the remembrance of the Cross merely because the calendar brings it round, because we are again nearly at the full moon that determines Easter. It is only as we are hungry for it that we can really say: "The time has come." Our business is to think together of the Cross and what it signifies in this authentic hunger of the spirit.

Dean Purdy is author jointly with a former colleague on this Foundation, Dr. G. H. C. Macgregor, of a work entitled: *Jew and Greek: Tutors unto Christ*, which provides a point of departure, with its idea of things to be learned from Christ and from the Cross—the lesson of Good Friday—in an education of the world in which Jew and Greek were "tutors." What was the subject of this tuition, was it not the ultimate meaning of the Cross of Christ—the very question to which we give ourselves now? We go back to the first recorded statement, purporting to explain the crucifixion of Jesus, technically called the 'titulus' or cross-title referred to, in slightly variant forms, in all Four Gospels. "This is Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews." According to St. John 19:20 and some texts of St. Luke 23:38 this inscription or titulus was written "in letters of Hebrew and Greek and Latin." The titulus was carried at the head of the procession towards the place of execution. Down what we now know as the Via Dolorosa in Jerusalem, from the place of condemnation to the place called Calvary, went the Good Friday procession, since pursued in Christian devotion by the feet of multitudes of pilgrims in whom we may perhaps in symbol see history in the sequence of Calvary. There at its original head, when it was

first 'event', went a man bearing a plaque, subsequently nailed over the head of the prisoner on the cross, and recording his accusation and charge. The Roman Empire desired that the world might have some knowledge of its 'justice'. For this purpose the accusation was written "in Hebrew, and Greek, and Latin." "This is Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews." From the Latin text comes the familiar Christian monogram I.N.R.I.

In the trilingual situation of Judea in those days, (incidentally repeated during the British mandate in Palestine from 1921-1947 when everything was in letters of English, and Hebrew, and Arabic) three official languages explain the legal ground for this particular execution. The result is the first recorded statement of what the Cross is and why it happens. But only one word really needed translation: the rest, being names, had simply to be transliterated — 'Jesus', 'Nazareth', 'the Jews'. (All these, being common names, would go equally, or almost equally, into any speech.) The operative or crucial word, as far as translation is concerned, was the word King:—Malek, Basileus, Rex. Jesus was identified by his personal name. Nazareth was his place of habitation, where he had been a carpenter, and whence, fewer than three years before, he had come forth to preach. The Jews were the people in whose history these things were happening.

This word 'King' compels reflection. Though translated into Hebrew and Greek, it moved essentially in Latin realms. You may remember in a remarkable passage, St. John 18:33-38 and the narrative of our Lord in the presence of Pilate, comes the remarkable exchange which, as paraphrased by C. H. Dodd, opens up the whole duty of our thoughts. (The passage is quite effectively rendered in the New English Bible, New Testament.) Pilate opens the exchange by remarking: "King of the Jews, I understand," or, if you prefer it: "Are you the King of the Jews?" with the implication that this is the 'nub' of the allegations. Here is the rumour; this is the charge. Immediately, Jesus seems to enter into a sort of counter-interrogation. "Are you using this word of yourself, as a Roman would, or are you quoting what you have heard from others?" ("Speakest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell it thee of me?") Pilate is impatient with this seeming equivocation. He is the sort of brusque Roman soldier who believes that every question is capable of "yes" or "no" in reply and this is what he

wants. "Do you take me for a Jew? It is your own people who say you claim to be a king."

Jesus:—"If I were a king, as you are using this word, I should not have been taken a prisoner without a fight. But my kingdom is not of that kind."

Pilate—further mystified and maybe a little chastened—"Then you admit you claim to be a king?"

Jesus—"King is your word, not mine. My mission in the world is to bear witness to the truth. My subjects are those who are loyal to the truth."

Then the famous phrase with which the exchange ends: "What is truth?" and Pilate, as Francis Bacon has it, not "staying for an answer."

What is the issue in this seemingly evasive reply of our Lord to Pilate? Was it not that He was unable to answer "yes" or "no" to Pilate's opening question without first knowing what the decisive word meant. Had He said to Pilate: "Yes, I am," He would have played into the hands of Pilate's concept of what kingship was. A Roman never had any other notion of kingship but that which was political, the sort of kingship, that is, which did not apply to our Lord. If, to obviate this misunderstanding, Jesus had replied to Pilate: "No I am not a king," He would have obscured and denied the sense in which He was. This is the kind of situation (and how often it recurs in Christian communication) where you cannot rightly speak until you have taken both yourself and your listener into an agreed sense of the words which you and he are diversely using. Pilate's was certainly not a question capable of a yes or no answer.

This necessity to penetrate the sense of the word is the reason for Jesus' seeming equivocation. His response to Pilate is really the profoundest sort of honest communication which exposes ambiguity, refuses confusion and lives in truth.

A similar issue had vitally to do with the meaning of the phrase: "the Son of Man" and "the Messiah." The same sort of ambiguity attaches to being "Messiah," which is after all the Hebraic rather than the Roman or Latin form of thought. But essentially the same ambivalence obtains as with 'king'. It persists in the context of the entire ministry of our Lord and the setting of Jewish expectation.

A right and noteworthy feature of the New English Bible N.T. is that all through the Gospels it refuses to use the word Christ and speaks about "the Messiah." This obviates the widespread confusion of mind arising when people use "Christ," as a synonym for Jesus, as if it were an alternative name. For when they do so they fail to appreciate that Jesus is a personal designation and Christ an official title. So that the situation is roughly analogous to talking about King George, or Pharaoh Amenhotep, or Julius Caesar. It is important that we should think of Jesus as "the Christ" and understand that how He is so is a constant, cumulative, Messianic decision at the very heart of the Gospel story. We only understand the meaning of the Cross when we enter it through a recognition of the nature of this Messianic decision.

The reasons that prompt this excursus into New Testament discussion come to me by way of an attempt to understand the Islamic situation. Here is the sort of struggle that is thrust upon the Christian in his own New Testament, by virtue of the exacting business of trying to relate himself rightly to the thought of Islam. This must be my apology for all that is exegetically inadequate to its New Testament setting. The crucial thing for us to reckon with is *how* Jesus is the Christ, or, if you like, "Messiah according to Jesus," as the living, and indeed agonizing, decision clearly taken through the story of our Lord's ministry.

Stay for a moment on a passage that lights all this up and makes it absolutely plain. There is a remark in II Corinthians 5:16 which has been the occasion of much exegetical stupidity, where St. Paul is accused of being sublimely indifferent to "the Jesus of history." We are invited to believe that the Apostle was entirely unconcerned about the Palestinian Jesus, that he cared nothing for Nazareth or Galilee. All these things he had long lost sight of in preparing the way for the Christ of Nicean Christology. So we are invited to believe. Yet this alleged 'indifference' to the Jesus of the earthly ministry is foisted upon a passage which is completely misconstrued. It runs in the authorized version: "Though we have known Christ after the flesh yet now henceforth know we Him no more." Here, so we are told, is the Apostle asserting the negligibility of the Jesus of the Gospels:—"now henceforth know we Him no more." But the passage does not speak about Jesus at all! It speaks about "Christ," about "*the* Christ." "We have known *the* Christ after the

flesh"—we have our ideas of what the Messiah should be like. We thought of Him in patterns of national prestige, of self-regarding aggrandizement, thought of Him in the patterns of the natural man, this Messiah-God. But when the actual Jesus as Messiah became known to us, then in this Christ the old way of looking at things, has gone. The new has come: new concepts of the Messiah, by which they are no longer thinking in categories dictated by the passions of the flesh. All this has nothing to do with some supposed indifference to how Jesus was. St. Paul could not have understood Messiahship according to Jesus unless he had closely followed all the antecedents of his Master's choices. Here it is, then, the Messianic decision of Jesus of Nazareth—in terms of the title on the Cross: Jesus in His own self-determined role of kingship.

It must needs be clear how strong and menacing were those popular national concepts of the Messiah, shared as they were by almost all the contemporaries of our Lord, including His own disciples. Jesus stepped into a situation of extreme difficulty in which He could only fulfill the expectations of men by first transforming them. He could only satisfy what He had first revolutionized. He could only be the Heavenly Messiah by steadfastly refusing to be the popular Messiah. How immense this battle was; immense, not so much in terms of the doubtfulness of the outcome, but rather of the awesome power of the pressures for the alternative. The Maccabees had not died in vain. The world of the New Testament, if you read between the lines, is full of men of violence wanting to take the Kingdom of Heaven by force. There is evidence even among the disciples. Certainly Simon, the Zealot, if you may understand his name in the obvious sense, was an ardent nationalist. It is possible that Iscariot, Judas' name, means, not of Kerioth (i.e. a place name) but 'dagger-bearer' from the Latin word for a dagger, meaning roughly "Judas the terrorist." If this conjecture is right, a great deal of light is thrown on the ultimate betrayal.

But be this as it may the atmosphere in which our Lord lived and moved was heavy with intrigue and bitter with passion. We certainly must read between the lines of the way in which even the Last Supper was arranged, that strange secrecy about a man with a pitcher of water. These measures concealed many of the activities and operations of those final days from perpetually vigilant spies anxious to discover what they so dearly wanted to know. All this is

the context and it is obviously shaped by the passions of Jewish nationalism, by that kind of easy hatred and resentment which identified evil with the yoke of Rome, which saw the Messianic business as essentially the battle for independence. These were the passions of the New Testament situation, most of all in Jerusalem, where Jesus readily and courageously came, knowing the issue in all its intense menace. How easy it would have been for our Lord to fall into these patterns, and be in fact the popular Messiah. This was the ever present and ever false alternative. In His sustained decision our Lord had ultimately no reliance but His own dependence on the Spirit of God. This was the *via dolorosa* that He travelled on.

Plainly present is this appeal of the popular, this world of the political Messiahship in the meaning of the first temptation. It summoned Him to the Messianic banquet, to perpetual compassion, to scheming, and planning, to an economic salvation. The temptation lay in that such compassion for the material needs of men be taken as not simply intimating the presence of the Kingdom but constituting the Kingdom in itself. Consider in the same connection the obtuseness of the disciples, our Lord's efforts to educate them into a sense of His identity; and yet at the same time to wean them from those concepts which He knew would accompany the recognition of His identity. There never was an educational situation more delicate or more difficult. Remember how the crucial question was put to them—"Whom say ye that I am?" The recognition came when Peter spoke. From that time forth Jesus began to show, on this frail basis of confession, (though it was likened to a rock) that the office or role in which they had now glimpsed Him was something entirely different from the conception they had of it. At once, Peter the confessor registered their dismay: "Pity thyself; this shall never be to thee." It would be right that the servants of the Messiah should suffer; they might well expect adversity. They were ready to fight like Maccabees. But the Messiah Himself, the Son of Man, that *He* should be humiliated, that the central agent of the divine majesty should, in fact, be a miserable victim of oppression and cruelty, this was unthinkable. This would immediately veto the whole Messianic notion. If Jesus conceived of the Messiahship in these terms it was a Messiahship that was already self-frustrated because it had not recognized the

essential first principle of self-preservation. In the end the disciples let Jesus be crucified—not primarily because they were afraid, in the sense of pure cowardice (for after all their loyalty was dogged)—they let Jesus be crucified in utter bewilderment about His refusal to be the sort of Messiah they could intelligently follow.

It is significant that when the soldiers were looking around for someone to carry the Cross, no one was available from the disciples. This was poetically right because they had never carried it before. They had never shared the nature of the decisions that brought the Master to it. So it was not Simon Peter, certainly not Simon the Zealot, but another Simon, of Cyrene—"him they compelled to bear His cross" because Jesus had been unsuccessful in inviting his disciples to do the same. We conclude that the disciples did not understand the Cross until it had happened, and that the sort of patterns that took Jesus into it were to them utterly tragic and inexplicable. They "trusted that it should have been He who should have redeemed Israel" and, clearly, because He was dead, He had failed.

The scribes and Pharisees, for their part, crucified Jesus for not being the sort of Messiah they demanded. Yet this is the paradox—this is the irony—the actual charge was that he was such a Messiah. If Jesus had been the sort of Messiah they said He was, such a Messiah would have no reason, from their point of view, to be hailed before Pilate. The condemnation of Jesus by Pilate was for the ostensible crime that any Jewish Messiah would have been popular in fulfilling. But the real provocation of the will to have Jesus crucified was His steady refusal to be the sort of Messiah they wanted.

Thus the choice of Jesus is the central event. The Cross is the way that Jesus interprets and takes the business of Messiahship. Remember how it goes in Malachi 3:1, "He whom ye seek shall suddenly come to His temple." The awaited one whom men desire—He who is the center of your hopes, He in whose person and in whose achievement, everything you desire is to be accomplished—"He whom ye seek" shall disconcertingly come. This "suddenly" is not time as of when (the modern sense of suddenly) but unexpectedly in the sense of how. "He whom ye seek shall disconcertingly come and who may abide the day, the pattern, of His coming?" Or in Isaiah 52:15—"So shall He startle many peoples." This is the

Christ according to Jesus, who goes counter in this utterly disconcerting fashion, to those whose history and tradition were looking for the Son of Man.

Jesus as the Christ then. But where did this Messianic decision come from? Was it from some influence that the servant songs had? Or was it the antecedent of a discernible pattern in Jeremiah's suffering unto truth? There is necessarily technical discussion on these points. Some recent writers tend to make us more cautious about deriving our Lord's decision from the conscious effect of those particular Scriptures upon Him. The exegetical debate has many facets. But it may be significant that the very phrase in Isaiah 53:3, "We esteemed him not," is exactly re-echoed in St. Mark 9:12 "the Son of Man will be set at naught." This is precisely the same concept; "they esteemed him not": "The Son of Man will be set at naught." Be this as it may, even if we could fully establish that the passages relating to the suffering servant were operative in the mind of our Lord, we would be still left with the ultimate question "How were these the right guides to be followed?" Having a precedent does not validate its content. It is only the intrinsic rightness of the way the suffering servant was which could have weighed with Him. So whether they are, as it were, operative or not, in this historic sense, we must seek the ultimate ground that will validate the patterns of the Cross.

Here we come right to the very heart of Christianity. Here is the essence of the lesson of the Cross. The way in which Jesus is the Christ is the ground on which He is Lord. The way in which Jesus is the Christ is really a coming out into the open in our human history of what it means that God is God. What we have been arguing is the central core of the Christian creed. "Jesus Christ—Lord"—or any order you like—"Christ Jesus, my Lord," or "Jesus Christ the Lord," whichever way you put it, it does not matter. Here is the historic person; here is the Messianic fulfillment; here is the disclosure of God. These are inseparable. They come together in the ruling event which is the disclosure of God in Christ; the way in which Jesus is the Christ is the reason why He is the Lord. And the meaning of the fact that Jesus, as *this* Christ, is the Lord is the secret where we read the nature of God. As Lancelot Andrews put it in one of his sermons, on Good Friday, 1597: "The perfection of our knowledge in and of Christ is the knowledge of

His piercing; this is the chief sight, and in this sight is all sights, so that, know this and you know all."

Christianity believes in a divine salvation because it believes in a tragic salvation. This decision to be crucified is, in time and space, "the one perfect sacrament of the power by which, in the end and in the whole, all evil is redeemed." The Jesus Who as Christ is willing to fail, that He may have the only kind of success that love could value. Christ crucified is the power of God, and the wisdom.

What is this word "crucified"? What do we mean when we say, "Behold the Lamb of God which bears the sin of the world."? The forces which shaped the desire to have Jesus dead epitomize the lostness of humanity. As Kamel Hussein of Cairo, in his book, *City of Wrong* so very clearly sees, Good Friday is the day on which humanity finds a mirror held up to itself in which it may see its likeness. The worst that you can say about our human scene and situation is that it is the sort of place where the crucifixion of Jesus could have been wanted. In that sense, Good Friday is the darkest day—dark with the essential darkness of human sin. And this is the sin of the world, not quantitatively—not some great heap, or aggregate, or accumulation, of all the separated sins of all time in some vast quantity. This is not the Christian way of understanding time. But here qualitatively, the sin of the world, all the wrongness of our own hearts and of our history is, as it were, qualitatively present in the generation and the local scene which says: "Let him be crucified." And it is in this sense that we were there when they crucified our Lord. Here we have the representative wrongness of humanity. And all of it is brought, so to speak, into its own expression by the presence of Jesus as Messiah. The sin is men's own, but those decisions, those choices, those alternatives in which Jesus as the Christ confronts them, provide the occasion in which they reveal themselves. And what does He do with this qualitatively representative sin of the world? This is the meaning of His Messiahship. The nature of His Messiahship brings out the nature of the situation with which His Messiahship must deal. Here in the very rejection of Christ the measure of His rejectors is understood.

How shall they be saved? Where can there be a divine action commensurate with this quality of human wrongness? It is there in the same event, in the forgivingness of Christ. You can say, in a sense, that the sin of the world has been forgiven in the representa-

tive and inclusive love, divine in its quality, of Jesus as the Christ. And so the sin of the world and the love of God are met symbolically in the same event: and it is with this in view that Jesus endured the Cross. And this is the revelation of the nature of God.

What does it mean that God is God? When we say: "I believe in God," what do we enthrone? Unto what do we relate all things? What I have tried to say is this—and it is the heart of the Christian faith—what it means that God is God is in what it means that Jesus is the Christ. This Messianic decision in the hard facts of human history is the self-disclosure of God in action. This is what we mean when we say: "Jesus Christ is Lord." This divinity of Christ, as we learn when we try to talk to Muslims, is not merely a theological debate, a matter of proving that Jesus is the Son of God in some kind of abstract, metaphysical and argumentative fashion! It is a tragedy that when we speak of 'Christology' we immediately begin to think about metaphysical definitions. Christology seems to be wholly taken up with the Chalcedonian formula and all that goes before and that follows it. But this is not in the ultimate sense Christology. 'Being the Christ' is not some mystery that ontology may define. Christology has to do with being the Christ, and being the Christ is action in the human situation for bringing in that divine kingdom which transcends and redeems the evil that men do. It is in this sense that the Christological secret is an open one—there to see, in the meaning of the Cross. "This is Jesus, the King of the Jews." What it is that God is God is known assuredly in what it is that *Jésus* is the Christ.

Let us conclude with a moving question from the Book of Exodus. When Moses was sent to his people with a summons out of Egypt, in his timidity, he asks: "When I go to them and say the God of your fathers appeared to me and He means you to make an exodus into liberation, and in their skepticism they say to me, what is His name? What shall I say to them?" This is not a metaphysical question. His people, wondering about this glimmer of hope out of the bondage of Egypt, are not asking theological questions. "What is His name?" means: "what is His dependable character? How shall we know that this God in whose name you propose to lead us out—how shall we know that He is dependable?" "What shall I say?" asks Moses. What is the answer Moses gets? In effect it is this: "You will not know the God of the Exodus except you go through

the Exodus with Him. I will be there as he whom I there will be. You cannot know me aside from the event which discloses me. You will not know me except as I am known in your trust in me, and I will be there. There are no guarantees in advance."

What is His name? If you do not know how to *call* Him, you will not know how to *call upon* Him. You must discover Him where He is revealed. "I will be there." You will know who I am when you come with me where I take you. This is what is meant in Exodus. Is not this the whole Biblical principle, that God is known in the historical event, in the experience of His power and action? The Christian has learned to transfer all this to the Cross and to say "God has been there as He whom He there has been." God is there as He who there Christ is. This is the lesson—the way in which Jesus is Messiah, which is the way of the Cross, is the point and place in history, where, dependably and forevermore, God is known. Now this, if I understand it, is the lesson which all history has been reluctant to take. It is the business of the Church in the world so to live and so to think that this reluctance on every hand, whether Roman, or Greek, or Hebrew, or Islamic, or even more subtly a reluctance within the Church itself, is patiently, steadily overcome, to call all men to recognize and know God, commensurately with our confession that Jesus is the Christ of God.

2. THE RELUCTANCE—CLASSICAL

How many curious coincidences there are in life and history! One would not normally connect the poet Dante with Karl Marx. To discover points of likeness between *The Divine Comedy* and *Das Kapital* would be difficult indeed. Yet Karl Marx was a great lover of Dante and knew *The Divine Comedy* entirely by heart. Another of these intriguing coincidences concerns the famous Charles Doughty who was one of the most courageous of Christian explorers in Arabia. Unlike most, he did not adopt the device of professing Islam, but went up and down in the Hijaz—though not, of course, to Mecca itself—openly as a Christian. Throughout the course of those wanderings in Arabia he always had by him in his pocket and read almost every day Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*. How did they seem to a pilgrim in the cradle-land of Islam?

But this fortuitous link between Canterbury and Islam recurs in

the Cathedral itself. A crescent is nailed into the roof of the sanctuary of the Cathedral, diagonally above the Holy Table, and has been there for over six centuries. Of course, the crescent is not the ideal symbol of Islam and to speak about "the Cross and the Crescent," is a very inapt usage with which to try to represent a situation. It would be much better to refer to the Hijrah and the Cross. For these are the two events in either faith which are really representative of what we mean. In ordinary day-to-day ideas crescent and cross are often set over against each other crudely. At all events here is this crescent, nailed into the roof of Canterbury Cathedral, which chemical analysis proves to be of foreign origin. It seems certain that somebody put it there when it was brought back from the Crusades. It may well have come from atop some eastern mosque in Damascus or Aleppo. There it has been, a kind of remote yet close spectator of the central Christian sacrament and the heart of Christian worship. Yet the contact is purely casual and accidental. In that too it is a symbol or parable.

Our ultimate concern is how we express our Christian faith in the world of other men's faiths. (This form of words seems better than dubbing them non-Christian faiths—a usage that only sees things in relation to ourselves. They are positive entities in their own right.) But before we look into Islam it may be wise to study the reason why the meaning of the Cross was greeted with incredulity and with amazement, by its immediate contemporaries and by the people from whom you would most have expected its acceptance. For many of the reasons that underlie the New Testament opposition to the Cross, that is, of the Jews and the Greeks, illuminate also the Muslim reluctance which in many senses reproduces these antagonisms. The 'Classical' New Testament rejection of the meaning of the Cross is expressed in the Hebrew reaction to it as a stumbling block, and the Greek estimate of it as foolish.

One might have expected, at least among the Jews, an acceptance of Jesus as Messiah. From one point of view, all that He accomplished as sealed in the resurrection fulfilled Jewish expectation. St. Paul claims that in the Gospel of the Cross the righteousness of God is manifested "from faith to faith." (Perhaps this is just a form of words meaning "to faith from start to finish." cf. "from glory to glory" and "from strength to strength" i.e. an intensifying glory and a growing strength.) "From faith to faith" however may be taken

to suggest a movement from the faith embodied in the Jewish Messianic hope anticipating the righteousness of God to that fulfilled in Christ. In the hope of Messiah lay a consciousness of a wrong in the human situation which implicated the very sovereignty of God and which would therefore sooner or later attract a Divine initiative to put it right, in the absence of which the very God-ness of God would cease to be significant. Such was Jewish faith in God's capacity to right history and to do so through His central servant or instrument. St. Paul means in Romans 1:17; "From *that* faith, to *this* faith in Christ crucified." The former is realized in the meaning of the Cross. Truly, "He came unto His own." This Messianic fulfillment was the accomplishment of all those anticipations in transforming and superseding them. Yet this continuity is not recognized. Men considered that their expectations, far from being realized in the Cross, had been completely betrayed. The manner of the fulfillment of the Messiahship in the Cross was too much for their belief about the fact of it. So they continued to look for a fulfillment after their own hearts.

Where was this issue in the Jewish soul about the validity or non-validity of Jesus as the Christ and the continuity or the non-continuity of the Cross with Jewish Messianism really thought out? The obvious answer is in the Saul-Paul biography in the New Testament. Hence the reason why the story of the conversion of one person has taken up so central and vital a place in the New Testament document. The battle that underlies the struggle of Saul in becoming Paul epitomized the whole issue, as plainly appears from the story of the Damascus road.

What arrested St. Paul in vision form was the essential truth that we are concerned to try to clarify: Jesus as Messiah, the Jesus of Nazareth who was crucified, this Jesus as the Messiah, and in this Messiahship the Lordship which is Divine. Christ Jesus "Lord"—this is the heart as well as the fount of all Christian creeds. This concept is the very heart of the vision of the Damascus road. "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest." Note not: "I am Christ." (The importance of the distinction suggested earlier.) A voice from Heaven that said: "I am Christ" would have caused no surprise; nor would it have constituted a personal revolution for the soul that heard it. After all was not the Christ seated at the right hand of power? Was He not supposed to be coming on the clouds of Heaven? The idea

of the Christ at the right hand of the majesty on high was nothing remarkable to any reader of the book of Enoch who knew his Jewish soul. There is no potential conversion in such an announcement. Wonderful! no doubt but in a sense quite ordinary—quite within the normal range of Jewish ideas and vision. But the voice said: “I am Jesus whom thou persecutest.” Here is the central affirmation of the Christian Church in vision form—*Jesus* at the right hand of power. The person of the actual Cross is the Christ on the right hand, “whom thou persecutest.” This clause points to the solidarity between our Lord and His disciples. Saul’s antagonism to the Church is plainly continuous with the antagonism of the Pharisees to Jesus and His ministry. The resurrection had not convinced the Pharisees. As C. H. Dodd points out in his great book *The Meaning of Paul for Today*, the real encounter comes in this struggle in the conversion of Saul. The reasons why Saul persecutes the Church are entirely in line with those which motivated the Pharisees in persecuting Jesus. Jesus, in all His ministry, opened the way to the concept of the Messiahship of suffering and humiliation. By this very humiliation He proposed to be the central agent of the power of God. “As is His majesty, so is His mercy.” “He that ascended is he that descended.” The sovereignty of God is the capacity to suffer. This is the tremendous heart of New Testament faith, and this is what the Pharisees sensed in the ministry of Jesus with His compassion for the Publicans. Saul likewise was unwilling to recognize the significance of Jesus as the Christ, the significance borne in upon him in the unmistakable meaning of the heavenly vision. The Jesus of the actual Cross is the name the voice gives itself and the place where the voice comes from is the proper exaltation of the Christ. In vision form and in the biography transformed by this event we have the whole crisis about Messiahship according to Jesus. In this biography lies the victory of the crucified Messiah over the hostility of the Jewish reluctance epitomized in the personality of Saul, the persecutor.

Jesus, then, as the Christ; the teaching and the passion all one. Because our Lord taught as He did He died as He did. The teacher in the teaching and the teacher in the passion—these are one. The teaching is that which is rewarded by the rejection the Cross represents: this rejection taken and suffered is simply the self-consistency

of the teaching: Jesus as the Christ the true recognition of whom wins the heart of Saul and makes him into Paul.

This is the clue by which to examine the ongoing opposition in other persons. The issues will always be the same. What were the fundamental reasons why they were so bitterly reluctant to recognize as one the Messiahship and the Divinity of Jesus? (To confess the one is to recognize the other.) In the Messiahship is the meaning of the Lordship, and this sort of Messiahship is impossible save to Him who is Divine ("my Lord and my God" and we cannot say either of these validly or sincerely without uniting them). Whence is the perpetual, persistent, deep, intractable resistance?

The answer involves three interests: the people of God, the law of God and His people, and the God of the people and the law. Do we not see in this 'classical' reluctance, an introspective concern for the people of God whose status seemed jeopardized by even the early emphases of our Lord's ministry? In the economy of the Gospel story, His ministry was strictly in Jewish service. This is proved, as a rule, by the exception of the Syro-Phoenician woman: "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel." This was the proper concentration necessary before the universal principle could take over. The universalizing of the meaning of our Lord's ministry awaits the resurrection and the Church. "The disciples were called Christians first in Antioch." 'Christian' is the word that emerges when some distinction is required and 'believers', or any term with a Jewish supposition, is no longer adequate. But while there was this Palestinian, Jewish, territorial and economic concentration of our Lord's ministry, with the universality fully to emerge only in the time of the Church, that universality was always latent. And the opponents of our Lord sensed it. "Why does your Master eat and drink with Publicans and sinners?" in a pre-supposition of equality in all men. Here was a serious flouting of the dignity and privilege of the people of God. They proved a people unwilling to die to privilege that they might live in fulfillment. They were concerned for themselves as the people of God. The Jew as chosen was a fundamental pre-requisite of the sort of world of which they could make sense, unwilling as they were to allow God to decide how to use His own instrumentality. (The same temptation still besets the Church itself, even though the Church is not racially constituted as Jewry was.) They wanted to remain

God's servants on their own terms. The principle of the Cross seen in the very choices of Jesus Himself, is that God must be allowed to use His own instrumentality, in this case His people, in His own way. But they wished to turn vocation into privilege. And in all that our Lord had to do and to say about the Kingdom of Heaven, in His ready compassion, His openness to the despised, the Publicans and the sinners, the patterns of His ministry cut across the racial dignity. These attitudes were clearly in their mood a menace to their continuity as the people of God. They saw in the way in which Jesus was proposing to fulfill His Messiahship something destructive of their own status. Consider Isaac Pennington's words in the 17th century. "To trust God with all one is, to trust him with his own covenant, with everything whereby we might be secure from danger subject to his pleasure, this is faith in good earnest. He knows God who dares thus to trust him. Let others trust God *for* salvation. My spirit can never rest till it dares trust God *with* salvation." Substitute "status" here and you have exactly the New Testament analysis of the reason for the Jewish reluctance to recognize in Jesus the Christ. They were ready to trust God *for* status, but not *with* it. In other words, they were not willing to lay their very status at His feet, if His ongoing purposes required it.

Thus the people of God clinging to status, reject the Messianic decision in which Jesus transcends that privilege. That status, they would have said, was all the time in the name of the law; the people of God were the means to the law of God. Now here, seeing the ministry of our Lord as culminating in His Messianic choice, seemed to them dangerously risky. In His facility of forgiveness, His asserted Lordship over the Sabbath, His willingness to override the spirit of legalism were the factors which prompted their rejection of Him. Were they not dominated by the sanctity of the law? Did they not accept the sternest imperatives in order that having fulfilled them, they could sit down "in the sunshine of self-approval"? The spirit of the law sensed the inconvenient, disturbing factor of a new dimension of the law of the spirit clearly operating in the Messiahship that Jesus chose. And for this reason, both before and after the Cross, they rallied to the protection of that law of God which, in its legalistic form, would continue to minister to their self-esteem. The people of God and the law of God.

Finally their reason for finding in the Cross a stumbling block

was their concern for the sovereignty of God Himself. Here it is that we trace the reason why they so seriously rewrote those prophecies about the suffering servant. (See the appendix to William Manson's *Jesus the Messiah*, in which he sets in parallel columns the commentaries and the phrases of Isaiah 53. In many cases the humiliation which was described of the suffering servant, and by implication comes to be even more gloriously true about Jesus as the Christ, is transferred to his foes so that instead of reading, "He is despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," you have "*they*—i.e. the enemies of the Messiah—will be prostrate and they will mourn like a man in pain." Instead of: "He was smitten of God and afflicted," it transposes and says, "*We* were accounted stricken, smitten of God and afflicted." Instead of: "By his stripes we are healed," we read, "By devotion to his words, our sins will be forgiven us." And instead of, "As for his generation, who among them considered that he was cut off out of the land of the living and for the transgression of my people was he stricken," we are given the amazement of the enemies of the victorious Messiah. "The mighty of the people he will deliver up like sheep to the slaughter. There shall be none before him opening his mouth, or saying a word." This is the silence of confounded enemies, not the meekness of him who takes upon Himself the suffering that redeems. "Of all these things done in his days, who shall be able to tell?—he will cause the dominion of the Gentiles to pass away from Israel.") This rewriting comes from the temper that is concerned for the majesty of God. The mind behind it argues that the very majesty of God makes it unthinkable that He can be served by a servant whose humiliation was such as the Cross depicts. In other words, Divine Majesty and prophetic suffering do not properly co-exist. This Old and New Testament reason for finding the stumbling block in the Cross is not far from the mood and the mind of the mosque.

But why the Greeks with their taunt: "this folly"? There is no plain and full encounter within the pages of the New Testament narrative between the meaning of the Gospel and the Greek spirit. (The only echo of such encounter is in St. John 12:20 where "certain Greeks, came up to worship at the feast." The comment of our Lord is perhaps related to the Greek love of life, to the exultation in youth and beauty, to that typically Greek sense of the fleetingness

of strength. How time makes havoc of the glories of this world! Therefore we must enjoy them as admittedly transitory, blessings on which age and death lay their corrupting and destroying hand. So Jesus said: "He that loveth his life shall lose it." This, if we read it rightly, is His only direct comment as recorded in the four Gospels on the issues between Himself and Greek culture. This is too fragile to build any final case on.) But essentially the Greeks saw folly in the Cross because of that note about the Kingdom of heaven open to all believers. To say to a Greek in the language of the *Te Deum* "Thou hast opened the kingdom of Heaven to all believers," was quite unthinkable. In their characteristic mood, the Greeks always believed that the good society was necessarily aristocratic, built on good breeding, sound endowment and decent environment. When you had these, you might conceivably attain to the good life, but the rest of the human pyramid down below this blessed apex, the masses of mankind at the foundations of the social pyramid, were necessarily uncouth. You could not hope for them, not realistically. Without any particular callousness, the great minds tended to settle down into an aristocracy of virtue. The Christian Gospel cut right through all this, asserting that there was a Kingdom worthy of God, accessible to all, on only one condition, and that condition within the reach of all, mainly the aspiration of faith.

This was folly to the Greek, and with it the particularity of the Gospel, the idea that the eternal God had made a crux of human history in a remote Province of Judea by a miscarriage of Roman justice. But why do we study this reluctance—"to the Greeks foolishness, to the Jews a stumbling block?" For the reason that it was precisely these two great traditions, which in their normal working could not accommodate the Cross that, in the providence of God and in the framework of Christian worship and theology, provided precisely that instrumentality whereby the faith of the Cross could make itself articulate. This is the paradox. "Jew and Greek, tutors unto Christ" as Dean Purdy has it. The systems which could find no room for Him, which believed that what the Cross meant was incredible, none the less yielded their treasures for its proclamation. This is the gloriously hopeful thing. The New Testament persuades you that your very obstacles are your assets. This is beautifully pictured in the image of the door. ("Behold, I stand at the

door and knock.") The door that is the point of exclusion is also the point of admission. Everything depends on what happens at the hinge. And this is the paradox of world Christian communication. Those attitudes which most characteristically and most assuredly resisted the meaning of the Gospel, also provided the highway of its interpretation. May it not be that in the world of the 20th century we can expect to find men's reluctance—that reluctance to see in Jesus, the Christ, in Jesus Christ, to see the Lord, and to see God in Christ—yielding the occasions for His coming and His revealing?

3. THE RELUCTANCE—ISLAMIC

It has been argued that the heart of the Christian faith is to be seen in the way in which Jesus is the Christ and that this Messianic decision of our Lord is the central event in the Gospels. Further it is believed that at the heart of the Christian understanding of God is this likeness of Jesus Christ Who has come to be the point of reference for our knowledge of the Divine. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."

There are three central facts about the Cross of Christ. It is what men wanted to do about Jesus. Being humanly willed, it was Messianically embraced. Jesus embraced the enmity with which men confronted Him and, in the language of the Gospel, "He laid down His life." The way in which He took what man sought to do to Him was a definite and positive decision. "He endured the Cross," not merely as something which could not be escaped (as indeed it might well have been, if He had never gone to the Jerusalem where it happened but had stayed in Galilee) but as something positively borne. This thirdly was divinely authenticated. The Cross is thus a three-fold event—humanity in the wrong, Jesus as the Christ, and God in Christ. We have intrinsic evil, suffering love and the majesty of mercy. Remembering the reluctance of the Greek and Hebrew worlds to accept this fact as having this meaning, we discovered that in all hostility is a point of Christian opportunity. Truth finds its occasion of expression in the presence of contradiction. The Christian is to reckon sympathetically, open-heartedly with all that makes men reluctant to accept the thing he preaches.

It is well-known that reluctance to accept that account of God which is expressed in Jesus crucified is strong and persistent in

Islam. In line with our earlier thoughts on books in unlikely places, let us imagine the Quran being read by Saul of Tarsus on the road to Damascus—of course a historical impossibility. But if you can imagine such a situation, it is fair to say that Saul would have found certain things highly congenial. Suppose further you imagine the Quran being read by the two disciples on the road to Emmaus—they would have found at least certain stretches of it entirely familiar, and in harmony with their own thoughts. After all, for those two disciples on the road to Emmaus the crucifixion of the one they thought Messiah was the impossible thing that had, in fact, happened. The only difference between that and the Muslim is that the Cross is the same impossible that did not happen. Saul, on the road to Damascus, is insisting, so to speak, that this impossible must be “unhappened.” He must create a situation in which it could be as if it had never occurred, as he essays to do by the persecution of the Church. But in every case, whether Saul going to Damascus or the disciples to Emmaus, or for the Muslim directed by the Quran, this Christian sense of the power of God active in the humiliation and suffering of the Cross is the unspeakable-impossible.

Of the Quranic passages on which this position is based, the most important is the famous verse in Surah 4:158 “They did not kill him; they did not crucify him” and then that very enigmatic phrase,—“it only seemed so to them.” Or, “He was resembled to them.” The orthodox popular view is that somewhere close to the climax in Gethsemane, or Pilate’s judgement hall, Jesus was raised to Heaven and a substitute sufferer died in his place. This substitute sufferer was made to look entirely like Jesus, having the same external apparent identity and, in the place of the real Jesus, was in fact crucified. There are at least two other ways of taking this. One has been developed in the last century by the Ahmadiyyah movement and follows the line of certain extravagant New Testament criticism in the West, alleging that when Jesus was crucified, He did not, in fact, give up the ghost but was taken down from the cross with breath still in Him. In this sense that they did not crucify Him, meaning they did not cause Him to die by crucifixion. There is also the orthodox and popular view that He was never nailed to the cross at all in person but that some other person like Him was so nailed and succumbed. This still-living Jesus revived in the tomb, with the aid of ointment with which He was anointed, and later

came out of the sepulchre. After His healing, He went east and preached for many years in India, and finally died at or near the city of Srinager, Kashmir where His tomb may still be seen.

For it is possible to interpret this "It only seemed so to them" in some semi-mystical sense that merges the temporal, evidential and visible in the eternal and heavenly. Somewhere in the drama of the arrest and condemnation of Jesus eternity supervened and what went on in the realm of the phenomenal was unreal. Jesus only seemed to die. The Quranic word "to seem" is exactly synonymous with the Greek word that gives its name to the Docetic heresy. The interesting point, however, is that the desire of the Docetics to rescue Jesus from suffering was based on a concern for His divinity, whereas the Muslim hypothesis finds Jesus from start to finish no more than a prophet.

The death of Jesus, then, in a historical, real sense according to Islam was not allowed to happen. Let us go back to our three-fold sense of the event of the Cross, as something humanly willed, Messianically embraced, and divinely conceived. At the outset we must see clearly that the first of these is certainly affirmed in the Quran and also a great part of the second. What the negation intends is the third. We have to ask: "What is it that the Quran and the Muslim are denying?" Quite clearly, they are not denying the will to have Jesus crucified. The Quranic account is about something being frustrated. We could almost paraphrase it: "they were not allowed to kill him"; "they did not succeed in crucifying him." But heaven knows, they wanted to! The intention is present. There is no point in rescuing somebody by divine intervention from a danger that does not exist. The very hypothesis of its being made only apparent is itself enough to prove that, at any rate, it was intended. Moreover, if you have in view the popular version of this, then this other substitute who was crucified in place of Jesus only, in fact, suffered this fate when he was made to be identical with Jesus. The 'other' sufferer was not crucified until and insofar as he was *taken* to have been Jesus. The perpetrators were not aware of this substitution; had they been so, they would have desisted at once; and gone after the real Jesus, if they could conceivably have found Him. So it is unmistakably plain that within the intention of the crucifiers, Jesus was crucified. This event as something which men willed, did, in fact, happen. This aspect of its meaning is not at

all affected by the substitution. The decision which men have made about Jesus in their conclusion: "Let him be crucified!" stands and stands unassailably. It is Quranic, and we cannot say that the Quran denies the crucifixion, if you mean to eliminate this aspect. In this sense, it affirms it. Ask the Quran: "Did the contemporaries of Jesus intend His death?" the answer on any hypothesis is unmistakably, "Yes."

Any Muslim with the Quran may properly see the will to crucify Christ as real and as an index of the degree to which man can prefer the wrong. Men love darkness rather than light. Never is this more evident than their will to silence Jesus of Nazareth. All that is there, even if you accept and believe that they were not allowed to carry it through. But then something else follows even more important and more likely to be missed, namely that this will to crucify is not something that happens over-night. It slowly builds up. The scribes and Pharisees murmured, saying, "Why eateth your Master with Publicans and sinners?" This murmuring is in St. Luke 15—eight chapters away from the crucifixion. The antagonism to Jesus is cumulative. "Murmured" is a very sinister word like the rumblings of a thunderstorm drawing louder and nearer. The whole course of our Lord's voluntary action was to go where the thunder was loudest. In the end the storm broke on the cross. If Jesus was one whose execution men desired, then there must be implied in the Quran this preparatory process of increasing enmity. It is not there made explicit. But none of these things are explicit in the Quran. What does Jesus do with this hostility? What sort of a Jesus is it who needs to be rescued? Evidently He has not earlier rescued Himself by some shift of policy, or by some appeal to force. This Jesus of the Quran who has to be rescued by divine intervention at the last moment of His complete insecurity, may not be far removed from the actual Jesus the Gospels describe. The scribes and Pharisees murmured about publicans and sinners—our Lord did not alter His practices to abate their disapproval. When they chastened Him about the Sabbath, He did not desist from that sort of preaching. He did not invoke other forms of self-defence. Had He antecedently saved Himself, He would not have needed saving.

Imagine for a moment what the situation might have been with Jesus at the head of a movement like that of the Maccabees with

the fervor and exuberance of Maccabean national fighting spirit? Pilate would have had much more to do than wash his hands in a situation of that sort. But Jesus did not do this. And the fact that He did not do this seems to be implicit in the Quranic belief that God had to rescue Him. If this is so, then this hypothesis of rescue restores to us, or at any rate allows us to retain, a situation very much like that which the Gospels describe.

There are one or two indirect confirmations of this in the Quran itself. There are passages in Surahs 5, verse 71 and 2, verse 88, where these sufferings of the prophets at the hands of Jewish people are noted. The Jews are accused of killing prophets whose message did not suit them, "charging some with imposture and putting others to death." Here is a re-echo of the parable of the wicked husbandman. There is also that very moving and enigmatic passage in Surah 3, verse 56. God addresses Jesus and says: "I am causing you to die, and I will raise you unto myself." What this causing to die is, nobody really knows. The orthodox commentators are bound to postpone this to the post-millennial death of Jesus understood as an actual death followed by entombment in Medina. But this does not at all fit the context, because this "I am causing you to die" prefaces the rapture which is the very thing that happened after the Garden of Gethsemane in Surah 4:158. One might boldly conjecture that this experience of our Lord watching the clouds gather, feeling the danger deepen, going on with a ministry that was more and more obviously leading into peril—what is it but a steady approximation into the jaws of death? And it happens, as Jesus believes, by the design and intention of God. So you could well write over it, within his inner consciousness: "Jesus, I am causing you to die." And remember that the miraculous intervention to save is something which is not known in advance. This exegesis of Surah 3:56 may be entirely out of court, but it seems a creative possibility for an otherwise enigmatic phrase.

What of the third dimension? To the question: "Did the Cross happen in Islam?" the answer is "Yes" and "No." As man's act—"Yes." As Christ's act—"Probably." As God's act—"Not at all." Why this third? let's move from the question "Did the Cross happen?" to the other question: "Should it, or need it, happen as a means to a divine forgiveness?" This has many aspects, but the one we have time to try to treat takes us into a very large area of human

reluctance to believe about God in Christ crucified. It has to do with the relationship of omnipotence and forgiveness. This is one of the most sensitive and serious areas of Muslim-Christian distinction, and one in which very many people who have never heard of the Quran are instinctively Islamic. The theology behind this runs rather as follows.

God is omnipotent and He just forgives. The Cross is plainly unnecessary as an instrument of divine forgiveness. The omnipotent does not need help in doing things and therefore schemes of salvation whereby, so to speak, God is enabled to forgive sin, are something completely futile. Everything God does is effortless. He only says: "Be!" and it is! Omnipotence freely forgives, and all the Christian theology seen in the Cross is superfluous. But what is the proper co-relation between omnipotence and forgiveness? An omnipotent forgiveness truly is what the Cross has to do with. If as a Christian, I believe that in the proper sense of the phrase: "God finds means of forgiveness," it is not because I doubt His omnipotence. The necessity of means does not call into question the adequacy of His power. We are not as Christians finding the Cross central to a divine forgiveness because we have a suspicion that aside from it, God is not competent. If we hold fast to our conviction that through the Cross God forgives, it is not because the Cross enables a capacity which otherwise is inadequate, but because the Cross is, in fact, that divine capacity at work. How is this so?

Whence comes the idea that the Cross, atonement, a means of forgiveness, are improper and impossible? Probably from the Muslim insistence that sin is inalienable. The Quran lays great emphasis on this. God does not burden a soul with any burden save its own; no soul is chargeable except with its own charge, and so on (Surahs 2:287; 6:164 etc.). No man may deliver his brother or make account unto God for him. My responsibility is irremovably mine. My sins are my own, like my toothache—they cannot be alienated to anyone else. Nobody is in my capacity in the world. These relationships of life are not transferable. Responsibility belongs squarely with the individual and therefore it is improper to believe in some other soul carrying our burdens. The idea of a sin-bearer is out of court. On the day of judgement every soul will stand in the utter loneliness of its own existence.

Here is a truth, but a half truth; and a half truth that insists on

being the whole truth thereby makes itself untrue. What is the other side of this? We reach it in a true understanding of personality as necessarily mutual and relational. The selfishness of the prodigal is his own sin truly. But there are consequences of his sin in the life and experience of his father. My sins are mine, but they are also a part of a personal and social situation in which they have, maybe, dire consequences in the lives of others, especially those that are nearest to me. Sin attaching to persons cannot but go out into relationship. Now, my sin, in this sense, is borne by others not in the way that makes the guilt of it less mine, but in the sense that it vitally involves them in its consequences. The closer they are, the more deeply they are involved. Now, how those who are so involved in my sin take it, react to it, vitally affects the relationship. Think of the prodigal son: the same events which are in the son selfishness, are to the father grief. The only kind of escape open to the father is to repudiate the relationship, is to disown the sonship, is to break the bond. Insofar as he continues to be father, he continues to suffer, and this continuity of fatherhood is, of course, the sole basis of restoration. "I will arise and go to my father." The son just assumes an unbroken relationship. But it is the unbrokenness of it that has been perpetual pain to the father. The father just forgives. Truly! But what does it cost him in the meantime to maintain the relationship without which no reconciliation can happen? As the son is to the father, so the world is to God. What is known to us as sin is known to God as sorrow.

The Christian faith is much more concerned about *sin* as the breaking of relationship than about *sins* as infractions of law, and this vitally affects what you think about the restoration of the true situation. It was the same events which, as the Cross, were human self-assertion and Messianic sorrow—the same events. What was to man the representative wrongness was to Christ the inclusive occasion of agony and death. What did the sin of the world mean to the Messiah? Quite literally and objectively, it meant nails and death. This business about omnipotent forgiving—if it is purely a matter of omnipotence, then the situation does not need to exist anyway. As John Oman in *Grace and Personality* remarks: "From the point of view of pure omnipotent operations of grace, our isolation from God must be the easiest possible obstacle to remove—or rather the most senseless for God ever to permit." God cannot

create beings capable of love and then be in a situation of effortless forgiveness when they withhold the love he seeks. A forgiveness which is truly related to the human situation and that is adequately divine, will take omnipotence to achieve. But the question is not: Whether? the question is: How? Our thought of God, therefore, in forgiveness must be consistent with our understanding of Him in creation. Indeed, this word 'forgiveness' has to be broken down into two, 'forgiving-ness' and 'forgiven-ness'. It means both. If there is to be forgiven-ness for sinners, there must be forgiving-ness in God. Surely it is exactly forgivingness which we find in God in Christ. "Father forgive them, for they know not what they do." This is not properly thought of only as a prayer from a temporal situation to God; it is rather a soliloquy within the life of God Himself. The Cross is an historic fact, a divine forgiving-ness, breathed into a situation that, if we are right, embodies in a total and representative sense the human astrayness from God which needs forgiveness, an astrayness, so to speak, symbolized in the rejection of Jesus as the Christ.

So, forgiveness truly is an enterprise for the omnipotent; but the Cross is how it happens. If, therefore, you raise the question, "Need it happen; should it happen?" and if you have properly the measure of what sin means, and are speaking in terms that are adequately divine, then this forgiveness must necessarily be costly. A state of costlessness is not a proper synonym for divine omnipotence. The majesty is there. People have been afraid that if they believed the Cross, they would have a God less majestic than they wanted. On the contrary, it is not that God is less great, because you think of Him in the patterns of the Cross—He is differently greater. Indeed we may say that the ultimate Islamic concern to think greatly of God is the most compelling reason for being Christian.

4. THE RELUCTANCE—CHRISTIAN

We come finally and, as we certainly must honestly, to the area of reluctance to accept the lesson of Holy Week which characterizes the Christian Church itself. We have tried to study the central significance of the Cross, as the way in which our Lord Jesus is the Messiah, and how this is for the Christian the central point of reference for the knowledge of God. The central point of Christian

creed is the acknowledgment of Jesus Christ as Lord. Then we sought to look a little into the sources of Hebrew and Greek rejection of this lesson, their reluctance and their antagonism. Then the Islamic disapproval of the full Christian dimension of the Cross, taking care however to insist that certain aspects of what the Cross means as the deed that men willed and as the necessity that Jesus was ready to face, can be traced even within the Quranic denial. Our attempts to search the ultimate springs of the Muslim disavowal of the Cross as the purpose and activity of God Himself led us into a discussion of omnipotence and forgiveness. We saw that the question was not *whether* God had a capacity to forgive but *how*, in fact, such a forgiving mercy, worthily divine and adequate to our sinfulness, would move and work. For the Christian the Cross of Christ is the point where an omnipotent forgiveness fulfills itself.

What now, in all honesty is the Christian reluctance about its central doctrine? Take the familiar question with which Isaiah 53 opens: "Who hath believed what we have heard?" Clearly, the prophet who described the suffering servant in this chapter anticipated incredulity—"Who is going to believe it?" he asked. "To whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?" His instinctive thought was that men would not detect the arm of the Lord, or see the power of the Divine. They would not discern it in the sufferer whose visage was more marred than any man's. In its primary sense, this phrase: "Our report," has a passive meaning. 'Report' means "the thing which we have heard," rather than the thing that we have told. "Who will credit the tidings that have come to our ears?" Yet necessarily, what we have heard becomes what we say. In this sense, in a secondary way, the report became also that which the writer and the hearer in turn passes on to others. What begins by being something passively received turns into something actively proclaimed. This is the exact sense of the New Testament word: "the tradition." St. Paul writing to the Corinthians in I Cor. 15 says: "I delivered unto you that which I also received." He saw himself in a chain of sequence: what he told did not originate with him. He received it; it came to him from others and in turn he became the exponent and the witness to it. The same thought exactly occurs in the opening verses of the First Epistle of St. John: "That which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you." The Christian always stands, as it were, between that which he has seen and

those to whom he speaks it. In this sense the Church is the intermediary between the truth of God and the world of men.

The Christian faith is, therefore, always somebody's report: the Christian Gospel is always what somebody is saying. It is inseparable from those who bear it. For it is no abstract theory which can be propounded in academic detachment. It is no philosophical point of view which you could enunciate without being involved, or a something from which you can detach yourself in the telling of it. For you cannot state the Christian faith without the use of personal pronouns. You have to say: "Who for us men . . . came down from Heaven?" If you say: "Who came down from Heaven," you have not confessed the creed, having omitted the whole purpose of the Incarnation, a purpose which cannot be stated without using the personal pronoun. The very statement of the Christian faith involves the person who is stating it, and this is the sense in which the good news is inseparable from those who tell it. Our report and the faith of Christ cannot be known and certainly cannot be communicated without this involvement of people. Is not this situation focussed in the very ambiguity of the English word, "witness," as meaning both the thing that is said and the person saying it? Likewise the faith in Christ is necessarily a personal confession. Not that it is in any way subjective for it rests on history, but simply that inevitably and always the Gospel involves a 'teller'. A truth-telling thing, it is also a man-told thing.

Here it is that we must face the disloyalties and unworthinesses of the Christian community. They inevitably involve the word of God itself; the reputation of Christ is staked upon the reputation of His Church. This situation is apparent in the very structure of the New Testament itself. Where in fact is the Christian faith defined theologically and communally?—not in treatises, not in academic theses. It is defined in letters, letters which go to people and are a point of personal exchange. This is why the New Testament has so much to do with epistles and why these in turn have to do with down-to-earth situations concerning ordinary people in the midst of this world. These letters are the definitive documents of the faith, not as the dialogues of Plato, but epistles sent to people. In them and their affairs the Christian faith finds its definition. The Gospels in many senses share the same pattern. They are documents meant for circulation. Whatever may be true or may

not be true about the present trend of New Testament scholarship in certain circles to take a clue from the idea of a lectionary as lying behind the composition, or at any rate, the present form of certain of the Gospels, giving them their present shape as meant for public reading in the Christian community, according to a certain calendar, nobody can deny that they were documents meant for a living community, moving on in time beyond the apostolic generation, and out in territory beyond the Palestinian origins. These were the twin facts making requisite the writing of the Gospel history. Thus, the whole New Testament is a document vitally concerned with the co-existence of belief and people. Statement of the belief is all intermingled with the proper life of the people, who themselves are inexplicable as communities, aside from the faith which binds them together. This is the constant reciprocity which exists between the faith and the faithful. What it means to them is what it means: how it is seen in them is how it is seen. There is no escape from this, and it is at once the glorious and yet the terrifying truth about the Christian Church. The very word of God becomes inextricably identified with "our report." Therefore what *we* are is always a constant factor in what *it* seems to be.

It is in these terms that we have to assess the reluctance, the unworthiness, the frailty of the Christian trusteeship. What manner of people we are if we bear the name of Christ is, for good or ill, a testimony or a distortion as to who and what Christ is. Whether we like it or not, we have in trust, in the likeness that we bear before the world, the very beauty of God in Christ. Hence, that otherwise incredible expression in the pastoral epistles: "Adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things." (Titus 2:10) How can you paint the lily? How can the doctrine of God in Christ need any adornment? But we have not understood the Christian situation unless we see that this is an entirely appropriate command, if only for the negative reason that what we are can so readily falsify what it is. In other words, the writer is saying, "Let what you are be commensurate with what you preach," and this is no academic matter.

There are so many ways in which the Christian community betrays a sharp unlikeness to Christ. How can one properly pass in review all the sources of Christian failure in association with the word of the Cross? In so many subtle ways these disloyalties happen and the tension is perpetual. Even in our very glorying in the mean-

ing of the Cross, we can distort it. We can be pursuing, as those who are the community of Christ and Him crucified, the very same characteristics of prestige, of security, of self-esteem, which characterized the heirs of the old covenant and which finally spelled disloyalty to their destiny. The sins which afflicted the old covenant so readily reappear in the custodians of the new. Christian failure to be truly representative of the meaning of the Cross emerges in the Christian story, with the Church demanding power and authority, seeking a status, or sanctions that are purely of this world and so betraying the principle of the Cross itself which was that of exposure and of insecurity. True there is a real sense in which the Christian faith leaves room for the secular in this world. Statehood, quite properly, has its place. The Christian Gospel is rooted in the conviction of regeneration and as long as this is true, then the Kingdom of God is never co-terminous with unredeemed society. The Christian doctrine of the natural man means that the political order, the economic order, are areas of only relative justice and therefore cannot be identified with the nature of the Kingdom of God. They are under the authority of that Kingdom insofar as unregenerate men can be, but the fulness of their submission to the reign of Christ presupposes their acceptance of His claim. In this area of the *relative* justice of the external order, the Christian community may well be involved in certain aspects of the power of the state and certainly the state is not something from which the Church can exonerate itself. As long as it is in this world it must be pressing on that world the claims and demands of Christ, even though it confesses that these demands will never be adequately met aside from the individual conversion of the humanity that composes it. But if the Church can never be exonerated from these tasks in the social order, it must always be prepared to suffer in its own inner loyalty to the spirit of the Cross. The meaning of the Cross is that the Kingdom of Heaven is not one of compulsion. It can only come when the door is opened to Him who stands and knocks: and this, of course, is not and cannot be the posture of the state.

Here, are many deep questions that can hardly be summarized without being distorted. But the duty of the Christian community at this point is to the claims of the spirit of the Cross in its own inner life and relationship to the external world. It must refuse to

identify its own comfort and peace with the absolute claims of its Lord. It will be ready always to be a Church under the Cross, willing to be despised and rejected so that its witness to the love of God in Christ may be uncompromised and plain. Yet, this vocation will not warrant its withdrawal from those relative struggles for political and economic justice which can and do properly take place within an unredeemed society.

There is another area of our reluctance to bear the likeness of Christ which arises from our very orthodoxy. We become so familiar with the Gospel of Christ that we cease to be alive to it. We use phrases like "the Lamb of God" and "the precious blood" so readily that they become, as it were, the stock-in-trade of our preaching, that we do not ask ourselves whether we have "believed our report." In certain circles in Christendom, it may be that the cult of the physical Cross itself has been so developed as to obscure its real meaning. In this connection there has been, of late, a good deal of writing that is highly critical of the Christian creed on the ground that it has a kind of inverted love of sorrow, the cult of the crucifix and the contemplation of the wounds of Jesus. There are certain circles in Islamic thought which react strongly against this Christian relation to suffering. The accusation is that the glorification of suffering in this use of forms of art or patterns of hymnology displays an emphasis on the physical which is either psychologically improper or emotionally morbid. It may well be that in these ways we can honor the Cross and yet miss its heart. Surely here the proper corrective is the spirit and temper of the Gospels themselves. How reticent the four evangelists are about what happened on Good Friday in purely physical terms. It is clear, of course, from the narrative what our Lord suffered. But there is no attempt to penetrate in literal language or in actual description into what crucifixion meant nor into the exquisite suffering it inflicted. Over this there is drawn a kindly veil of silence. What ultimately matters is not the bleeding brow and the flowing blood and the sharp incision of the thorns (if such thorns they were). In the real meaning of the Cross, these were incidental. The real Cross is this unresenting exposure to men's evil hearts. It is in the bearing of shame that the Son of Man bears away the sin of the world. The central meaning of sacrifice is the principle of obedience to the demands of

love. We only invert the situation and distort the Gospels if we fail to keep these priorities.

Is it not always immensely difficult to preach on Good Friday? How shall we do justly by the ultimate questions about the 'rightness' of the Cross? "Ought not the Christ to have suffered these things and to enter into his glory?" Do we see the ultimate joy and the deep, abiding serenity of the crucifixion beyond those aspects of it which might become the occasion of a morbid, or even sadistic, interest in physical suffering for its own sake?

There are yet other subtle ways in which we can seem to be confessing the crucifixion of Christ without really reckoning with its inner power. Consider in this connection the familiar phrase about "bearing the cross," so often taken to refer to some suffering which cannot be escaped, a sudden loss of wealth or health of which men may say "This is my cross." Is there not then a strange and unhappy de-valuation of the real significance? For the Cross is not the passive acceptance of what cannot be escaped: it is the active embracing of what is taken up for the sake of the Kingdom of Heaven. Bearing the Cross is not the capacity to pity ourselves but to give ourselves into the requirements of God's Kingdom.

Or again we can refuse the real point while all the time seeming to espouse it. Some are ready to recognize the nobility of the crucifixion, to see there in the self-giving of Jesus a moral ultimate, a quality of love which is perfectly supreme. There is a very moving passage on this point in Henry James about Jesus the Galilean youth, able to set His face steadfastly for the highest ideals when utterly unaided by His disciples and by His tradition. This is the acceptance of the glory of the Cross considered as the ethical ultimate of Jesus our Lord. Yet this temper, or this mood, is not ready to take this conviction into the very heart of theology. In other words, within this world and in terms of the ethically ideal, the Cross is the last word. But it is not confessed or recognized that it is divine. And then it may well be (as Dr. Rahbar has pointed out on several occasions) that we have, in a sense, an ethical human who is more worthy of being worshipped, more worthy of being acknowledged than our concepts allow of God Himself. Must we not take the ethical into the theological? The Cross is only truly seen as expressive of the very heart of God Himself.

Take the ill-translated words of our Lord when questioned by

the high priest: "Hereafter ye shall see the Son of man . . . coming on the clouds of heaven." (St. Matt. 26:64). That leads us at once to think of some far distant future. But the meaning is: "Henceforth ye shall see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power and coming in the clouds of heaven." "*From henceforth*"—Jesus is telling the high priest that from the point of the Cross onward men will really know the heart of the divine. We have not fully embraced the Cross unless we have been ready to see that what happened on Calvary is a revelation of eternity.

Finally, our reluctances must be made to face the sense in which the Cross 'leaves room' for those who believe in it. This may seem a strange way of putting it, perhaps deliberately strange. We have been pondering these reluctances of Christian expression or Christian attitude which do not really measure up to the nature of what it is that is believed, acknowledging that we have often to say to ourselves: "We have not believed our own report in its full range and reach." Yet this is truest for the reason that the Cross leaves room for, or requires the conformity of, those who believe it and we withhold our part. In "The Man Who Died," D. H. Lawrence rewrites Good Friday and Easter. A still-living man stirs inside a tomb: he manages to loosen the stone and to crawl out, laying a torn hand on the ledge of the tomb. He stumbles and totters into a peasant's house and sits a while in the sun, slowly recovering a capacity to move around. It is a curious and bewildering story. The reader wonders where the phantasy of the author is going to take him, as he pictures this man out of the grave, a Jesus overcome with a deep nausea of disillusion. "My mission is over," he says. "Death has saved me from my own salvation." He will avoid being betrayed again. In the tomb he had slipped off that noose which we call care and learned his lesson. "The days of his interference with men are over." The whole idea is that our Lord, so to speak, in the time of His ministry had lived for compassion, had taught and preached, had spent Himself wholly for what He called the Kingdom of God. He had interfered with the habits and comfortable securities of the world that was against Him, and finally this interference had provoked that world to put Him to death, and this death had "saved Him from His own salvation." He had learned in the tomb not to interfere any longer with the world. In other words, in His coming out, He had repudiated the compassion of His ministry. Overcome

with disillusion, He would no longer run His head into the dead wall of this world's unwillingness to be saved. Men have executed Him as a reply to His enthusiasm, and He had learned His lesson. D. H. Lawrence goes on to argue that the reason for the mistake of Jesus and His ministry, which His death had taught Him to repudiate, was that all He wanted was to give—to give mercy, to give compassion, to give healing, to give good advice. Finally this utter willingness to give Himself, had cost Him all. It was time He began to receive. He who had been greedy to give must learn to be given to. His love was only one-sided; He had not been ready to accept. The second half of the story goes on to describe how He slowly recovered His capacity to move and so to feel, and so to yearn, and so to take. It ends with a mystical 'marriage' of a Jesus, who finally awakes to the world of D. H. Lawrence, as something with an indescribable joy which can only be taken in an equality of exchange. So He learns to outlive that kingdom which only gives and in which men had necessarily crucified Him.

The sure reply to this bizarre reading of the Cross may be drawn from *The Zeal of Thy House*, a noted play by Dorothy Sayers, which describes the main builder and architect of medieval Canterbury Cathedral, a man who lives for this tremendous job and gives everything to it. One day he is hoisted in a basket by a rope to see how the keystones are being fitted into the arch above the nave. The rope is defective and when it breaks the basket crashes. The architect is maimed for life. He tries to pursue his activity but his physical condition proves an insuperable handicap. He cannot concentrate, or give orders; he cannot stand the hours and has no patience with the details. But he is unwilling to give up and let somebody else build the house of the Lord. He wants to go on saying: "The zeal of Thine house has consumed me." Then he is visited by the angel, who finally persuades him that what God wants is the man himself and not his architecture. Or in the language of St. Paul to his Corinthians, "I seek not yours but you." One of the arguments of the angel is this:

"Be comforted then; thou that wast rich in gifts,

Though thou art broken,

It is on the self-same rack that broke


The richest prince of all the world, the Master Man.

Thou shalt not die save as he died, not suffer save with him."

Here is the final negation of D. H. Lawrence. Christ is utterly ready to take as well as to give, to receive as well as to die, or if the expression may be allowed, He leaves room on His cross for His Church. So, as Dorothy Sayers goes on,

"I go," said our Lord, "but feed my sheep,
"For me the Sabbath at the long week's close,
For you the task, for you the tongues of fire."
"Thus shalt thou know the master architect who plans so well
He may depart, and leave the work to others
Art Thou more than God?
Not God himself was indispensable
For lo! God died and still His work goes on."

Lawrence argues that Jesus was not willing to receive. But it was not His unwillingness; it was the incapacity of men, even His disciples, to go into the wine-press with Him to give the fellowship He sought. But beyond His resurrection this incapacity of theirs was changed. He departs and leaves the work to others. Is it not in this sense that St. Paul speaks of "filling up that which is lacking in the afflictions of Christ"? That which is lacking is not the cost of those afflictions in the realm of our redemption; it is the cost of those afflictions in the realm of our proclamation. The ground-work is accomplished, by Him who gave Himself, but the business of His kingdom is only carried on by those who give themselves. This surely is the meaning of St. Paul's ambition: "being made conformable unto his death." We shall find the ultimate disloyalty to the Cross at the very same place where loyalty to it calls us, namely this willingness to have our own lives moved and guided by the same principles in our small realm by which He Himself was led in the fulfillment of His Messiahship. If it is true that the way in which Jesus is the Christ is the proper clue to the meaning of the majesty and power of God, is it not also true that the way in which Jesus is the Christ is the pattern of the vocation of the Christian? It is here, here ultimately more than anywhere else, that our conformity to, or our discrepancy from, the lesson of the Cross will be seen and known.



Daud Rahbar

OBJECTIVISTIC AND THEOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF URDU LITERATURE AND PAKISTANI HISTORY—Daud Rahbar

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The Hartford Seminary Foundation has conferred an honour on me which is above my deserving. I do not intend to respond to this by asserting that Urdu and Pakistani Studies are an indispensable discipline for a theological seminary, but rather, I wish to suggest that as representing the life of more than one hundred millions of people these studies may provide an additional factor making towards human fellowship.

Pakistan is a country formed to safeguard the interests of the Muslim minority of India. We are already in the midst of the challenging question: What is a Muslim? What is Islam?

Islam is a religion of Semitic origin. It has now a history of nearly fourteen centuries. Muslims form nearly a seventh of the world population today. Almost the whole of Iran, Turkey, Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Indonesia is Muslim. There are great numbers of Muslims scattered in China, India, Soviet Russia and Africa.

It is a religion with a canonised scripture, the Qur'an, which is about a third the size of the Bible. Its text has statements that can serve, and have served, as the basis of a theology, a jurisprudence and a system of ritual. Its doctrinal statements are terse and emphasize two aspects of the divine being: (1) God's singleness, and (2) His sovereignty (characterised by His retributive justice of the judgement day.)

Islamic theology became thoroughly Hellenised toward the end of the second century of the Muslim calendar. This Hellenisation

caused the Qur'an's idea of God's singleness to be interpreted in terms of uniqueness understood as incomprehensibility. This line of interpretation in fact aimed at obscuring the other aspect of the Qur'an's teaching: the retributive justice of God.

The rapid expansion of the Muslim empire diverted Muslim intellects to the development of a state law supported by scripture. This led to a magnificent casuistry. However, as in all casuistic constructions, there came the construction of a top floor beyond which there was no scope of building. No skyscrapers really touch the skies: the prayers of men alone can do that.

After the first five centuries, both the theology and the jurisprudence of Islam became comparatively static. This gave the opportunity to mysticism. For the last seven centuries, Islam has been a religion with highly ecstatic attitudes. There have, however, been great Muslim empires until recently where the Muslim societies have cultivated architecture, music, poetry, historiography and other worthy pursuits to a high degree.

We must return now to Pakistan. The most important thing to remember is that Pakistan represents non-Arab Islam. This difference is very significant.¹ The majority of Muslims in India and Pakistan are Sunnī. No one can understand Islam without understanding the major sectarian division that has survived: the Shī'a and the Sunnī. The rise of the Shī'a sect in early Islam was caused by the importance attached among Arabs to the idea of descent. After Muḥammad's death, many Arabs believed that the successor of Muḥammad should be a close relative of Muḥammad. Since Muḥammad left no son, eyes fell on his son-in-law 'Alī who enjoyed the additional merit of being a cousin of Muḥammad, and also of having been one of Muḥammad's closest Companions and lieutenants. 'Alī, however, with all his piety and integrity, was a man of frail constitution and a rather retiring nature. His advocates were more enthusiastic about his election to the seat of Caliphate than he himself. Thus he remained a quiet spectator of the reigns of three caliphs, the first two of whom were great conquerors. As an outstanding survivor of Muḥammad's times, 'Alī was accepted by the community as Caliph at the time when the seat fell vacant the fourth time. His very astute opponent Mu'āwiya, a companion of

¹The Muslim community of India is predominantly of indigenous origin, mostly Aryan and some Dravidian, although there are some Muslims there of Turk, Afghan, Iranian and Arab descent.

Muḥammad, challenged 'Alī's authority at the famous battle of Ṣiffīn in 37/657. Anticipating his own defeat, Mu'āwiya proposed settlement by peaceful arbitration. 'Alī, essentially trustful by nature and in deference to the five hundred copies of the Qur'an that were being brandished by Mu'āwiya's soldiers accepted the proposal. His own representative at the negotiations was intimidated and joined in the decision in favour of Mu'āwiya. Thus the first dynastic caliphate was founded. 'Alī was soon killed in 661 by an assassin who had been his zealous supporter before 'Alī accepted the arbitration of Ṣiffīn. He and many others felt betrayed by 'Alī and formed the Khārījī sect. Though not a caliph himself during the early years of expansion, 'Alī had been highly respected as a man of saintly nature, and the mystical literature of Islam attributes a great many mystical utterances to 'Alī. Thus the spiritual pedigrees of all mystical orders in Islam are traced back to 'Alī.¹

The partisans of 'Alī's political rights form the Shī'a community of Islam. The rest of the Muslims are called Sunnī, ordinarily translated as 'orthodox,' but rendered as 'orthoprax' by some modern scholars.

The Shī'a persuasion won to its side almost the whole nation of Iran. The Shī'a made the justice of God on earth the central doctrine, and as a sensitive, sophisticated and highly civilized nation, the people of Iran felt sympathetic toward a creed of Arab origin (viz. the Shī'a creed) which enabled the people of Iran to register in a subtle and religious form resentment against social injustices of the Arab domination. According to a Shī'a version of history, the Princess Shahr Bānū, the daughter of the last Sassanian king Yezdgerd, was married to Ḥusayn the son of 'Alī. Modern historians doubt the historicity of this marriage, but the motive behind the version seems to be to establish the son of 'Alī as the rightful heir to the Sassanian throne.

I have said earlier that the majority of Muslims of India and Pakistan are Sunnī. But the Sunnī faith of Indian Muslims has been subjected to a strong Shī'a impact. This impact is due to the double status 'Alī enjoys in Islam as the hero of the Shī'a and as the sup-

¹Mu'āwiya was determined to exterminate 'Alī's power, and his own son Yazid went beyond his father's orders by killing 'Alī's son Ḥusayn instead of merely arresting him. The story of the killing of Ḥusayn, who was accompanied by a small group of about seventy persons including children and women forms the passion theme of the annual mourning during the Muslim lunar month of Muḥarram.

posed founder of Sufism or Muslim mysticism. Indian Islam is highly mystical. Therefore the mystical poetry of Muslim India, like that of Muslim Iran and Turkey, has a high esteem of 'Alī. People of poetical temperament, dominated by sublimated love, regard 'Alī as the supreme lover. They feel a deeper sympathy for the persevering and retiring 'Alī than for the great conquerors of the early caliphate. The last king of the Moghul dynasty of India, (a dynasty of Turk origin,) was accused of being a Shī'a because of his *mystical* (and not Shī'a) reverence for 'Alī, and had to print posters to suppress the rumors. I recall a message he sent to the female members of his family during the fatal mutiny of 1857: "Gather courage by remembering the sufferings of the family of 'Alī."

The Turks profess to be the most anti-Shī'a nation in the world. Yet by his mystical reverence for 'Alī, the greatest poet of the Urdu language, whose poetical name was Ghālib and who was of Turk descent, was also accused by his rivals of being a Shī'a. This sprang from his deep mystical admiration for 'Alī.

The literary language of the royal court under Muslim dynasties in India was Persian. This fact attracted some of the finest poets from Iran to the royal court at Delhī and the courts of princedom around Dehlī. These Shī'a poets were a profound influence on the Sunnī sect of India.

The sub-sect of the Sunnīs to which most of the Sunnīs of India belong is the Ḥanafī sect. In order to make explicit the Islamic scheme we may refer to the sectarian developments of early Islam. The great historian and philosopher Shahrastānī (d.548/1153) enumerates nearly seventy sects of early Islam, which suggests that religion was of greater concern during those generations. The generations of classical Islam, it seems, could belong to two sects at the same time, a juridical sect (rather school) and a theological sect. The dichotomy between Muslim jurisprudence (Fiqh) and theology (Kalām) began within a hundred years of the death of Muḥammad and achieved a kind of independence of the state from the "church." The Ḥanafī sect in fact consisted of those Muslims who had sympathy for the school of law founded by Abū Ḥanīfa (d.150/767).

Sunnī Islam forgot Abū Ḥanīfa's theology¹ and developed his

¹Abū Ḥanīfa himself belonged to a time when jurisprudence and theology had not yet become segregated, and his work *al-Fiqh al-Akbar* is perhaps the last great work using the word *Fiqh* in the wider and basic sense of pious investigation. Later, the word became reserved for jurisprudence, and the word *Kalām* was coined for theology.

jurisprudence. Now after the four major schools of Muslim law had matured at the end of the first three centuries of Islam, Muslim governments, with some variance in method and with some exceptions, set up law courts of all the schools, and litigants could choose their court of litigation.

I have said that most of the Sunnī Muslims of India and Pakistan still profess to be Ḥanafīs. They hardly realise that being a Ḥanafī in the traditional sense meant to be predisposed to litigate at the Ḥanafī court in a case requiring litigation. Since the abolition of the Muslim law courts in India under the British in 1864, being a Ḥanafī has ceased to be meaningful except in a few trivial matters of ritual about which the masses are more and more ignorant.

The distinguishing mark of the jurisprudence of Abū Ḥanīfa was his introduction to the principles of *ra'y* (personal opinion) and *istiḥsān* (deeming good what is good) in the Muslim legal system. This was done by him at a time when other jurists relied on the pious report of Muḥammad's word or deed forged almost on the spot to suit the confronting situation. It is true that in a way their manufacturing of pious reports involved exertion of personal judgement, but it also implied a disowning of responsibility. Abū Ḥanīfa brought frankness and courage to the system.¹

Let me also comment that behind the recent developments of cordiality between Turkey and Pakistan is the fact that both are (should we not say, 'one were?') predominantly Ḥanafī. There exist no Ḥanafī law courts in either of these two countries. Both now have secular jurisprudence, but the traditional sentiments are shared. The dynamic principle of Ḥanafī law in early centuries generated a spirit of tolerance among those Muslim peoples who accepted the Ḥanafī system. And though the system exists no more except theoretically, it has made the Muslims of India more accommodating.

In addition to Sufism, the Shī'a impact on the Sunnism of India and the impact of Abū Ḥanīfa, there is another factor rendering the Muslims of India more internationally minded, their centuries as a numerous minority surrounded by a more massive majority, the Hindus. After more than a thousand years of Muslim rule in India,

¹One of the greatest scholars of Indian Islam called Shibī wrote a substantial biography of Abū Ḥanīfa at the end of the last century and tried to make people's understanding of the jurist less superficial. The stimulus did not prove very effective and the book is read by very few. Its title is *Sīrat al-Nu'mān* and is written in Urdu.

less than one hundred millions of the population are Muslims, although there are two hundred and thirty millions of Hindus in India and Pakistan today. This partial conversion of the total population is peculiar to India. Elsewhere whole countries became Muslim: Iran, Northern Africa, the Turkish lands, Indonesia, Syria and Jordan. The exception in India is hard to explain. The Arabs conquered only a small part of Western India in the early part of the eighth century, and it seems that the unwieldiness of their military engagements left India as an abandoned front. Non-Arab Muslim dynasties ruled India from A.D. 1000 onward until 1857, but they apparently did not believe in enforcing conversions. It seems also that nonviolence in the form of a shrewd timidity in the predominantly vegetarian Hindu community caused the Muslims to lose interest in converting them. The Hindus always regarded the Muslims as 'untouchable' regardless of the fact that the Muslims were the rulers. This was eminently convenient for both the parties, this keeping of distance on the part of the Hindu was regarded as *respectable* by the Hindu and *respectful* by the Muslim.

In recent times the wide spread of the new international language, English, in India has become a great asset for the Muslim peoples of India and Pakistan. With that equipment they are beginning to lead the thinking of Islam in the entire world. There is no questioning the fact that the two greatest thinkers of modern Islam are Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān and Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl, both are from India.

* * * * *

Having described the religious heritage of Pakistan, I turn briefly to Urdu literature and its religious heritage. It is a language the syntax of which is of native origin. The classical music of India and the Urdu language are the two areas of the Indo-Muslim culture of India in which Hindus and Muslims have wholeheartedly participated.

The area of Urdu's origin is the Punjab where the first lasting kingdom was founded by the Muslims around A.D. 1000. It began as a result of half-articulate exchanges between foreign soldiers and native shopkeepers. It began as a language of army encampments. Hence it is called 'Urdu', a Turkish word meaning army or army camp.¹ The capital was shifted from Lahore to Dehlī in 1193. The armies brought to Dehlī a strange version of Punjābī mixed with

¹The English word *horde* is derived from the same Turkish word.

Arabic, Persian and Turkish. For about 150 years Urdu assimilated elements from languages east of Dehlī. In 1351 a temporary experimental shift of capital from Dehlī to a southern Indian town called Dawlatābād, led to a nostalgic Muslim colony of immigrants from Dehlī. This small community began to cherish Urdu for poetical writing, and the first refined poetry was produced by this small isolated colony. Literary creation there was led by the kings of two small dynasties who were Muslim. These kings left poetical works of considerable size, although the people in Dehlī and other cities of Northern India continued to regard the new mixed language as unworthy of literary creation. But by the beginning of the 18th century Moghul kings also began to compose poetry in Urdu and encouraged poets to write in that language.

In an effort to compete with Persian, the diffident new language undertook a wholesale adoption of Persian idiom and diction, translating idioms literally into the native vocabulary. Thus the virtues and vices of Persian poetry became part of the Urdu tradition.

The poetical literature of Urdu is very extensive and rich indeed. Serious prose, however, began with the British influence. A great deal has been produced in the last two centuries. No history of India of the last two centuries can be written without recognizing the Urdu press and literature as primary sources. The mobility of the soldiers spread the language throughout India and the language has been the *lingua franca* of India for nearly three centuries. It is still understood in almost every city in India, although the standard idiom cultivated in the capital Dehlī and the city of culture, Lucknow, is not used everywhere. Urdu is now one of the two national languages of Pakistan, the other being Bengali. Before the partition of India, Urdu was used for nearly half a century as the medium of instruction on undergraduate and post-graduate levels at the Osmania University in Hyderabad, Deccan. Hindi, the present day national language of Bharat, got its syntax ready-made from Urdu, and replaces words of Arabic and Persian derivation by words of Sanskrit origin.

The poetry of Urdu, after the Persian tradition, is generally mystical. It is persistently critical of ritual and the established forms of theology and jurisprudence. For this it has borrowed from Persian poetry a highly evasive symbolical diction behind which poets have always escaped the threat of persecution. Without doubt, the mystical poetry of Persian, Urdu and Turkish has been for seven whole

centuries the greatest outlet for religious integrity for the more sensitive Muslims.

* * * * *

Now I invite you to deliberations about the Christian approach to Urdu and Pakistani history. The greatest help to the study of non-Christian faiths by scholars in the Christian world, came as a result of the autonomy won by the empirical sciences from the tutelage of revealed religion.

It is certainly true, however, that with the establishment of this autonomy, the scientific venture has, to the eyes of most people, been deprived of consecration: the empirical habit has ousted or undermined the metaphysical habit and has weakened religion.

The question before us now is: to re-establish the metaphysical habit, must man recede from wholtime engagement with empiricism? Is there a return at all for man from an autonomous empiricism? Is such a return desirable? Is this autonomy a curse or a prize? Should man give it away or keep it?

The answer seems to be that it is not empiricism which is to blame so much as religion, which is slow in readapting itself to this tremendous change. In the pre-empirical ages, the rational faculties of man found satisfaction chiefly in the metaphysical theological domain. In our age rational aspirations are amply satisfied in the empirical realm, and it is the spiritual faculties that are now thwarted. Many conceive the autonomy of empiricism from a revelatory basis as a liberation only for empiricism, but the more thoughtful will not overlook the good fortune that this is potentially also a liberation for the revelatory experience from the norms of empiricism.

Let us try to be more explicit. The Christian experience is expressed in a benevolent mood that is responsive to love received in its most sublime form. Let us emphasize the word '*mood*' here, for we are going to assert that the only aspect of consciousness which is constantly compatible with wholtime empirical engagement is a mood which transcends the effects of that engagement on the soul of man.

Take the case of a Botany researcher engaged in laboratory work. He has only last night proposed marriage to his *fiancée* who has said 'yes.' This has created a joyful mood, a frame of mind which is generated by a happy event. While observing his Botanical data through a microscope, the student consciously recollects his girl and his meetings with her only *intermittently*. And yet his mood is pres-

ent *all the time*, conditioned by the event of the girl's 'Yes.' Suppose this same boy, instead of experiencing just that 'mood,' undertakes while looking through the microscope, a thoroughly rational examination of his girl's acceptance of the proposal. The results are two-fold: (1) his mood is liquidated. (2) his Botanical research is interrupted. It is evident that two independent rational problems can not efficiently be handled by the mind simultaneously.

At this point may we begin by affirming that the revelation of God in Jesus is the revelation of divine *disposition*. In my own thought during the past year, the word *disposition* is the one which I have stressed most. The core of the revelation in the New Testament is the disclosure of a loving, forbearing, forgiving and charitable disposition. It is in this and not in other comprehensions of cosmology that the uniqueness of the New Testament consists. Moreover, it is only by looking at the New Testament this way that the variance of versions among the Gospels offers no problem. For one is able to experience throughout the New Testament a general uniformity of the disposition of the Worshipable.

Experience of the perfectly loving disposition of God in Jesus Christ is the door to the worship of the true Lord. Anyone who hastens to the rationalising venture before being sure that his or her heart has been warmed by the knowledge of God's love, is rationalising cold feelings. It is true that a fruitful despair may result from a premature rationalising which may enrich a subsequent experience of God's love. But truly Christian articulation in reasoned terms must be based on real experience of that love.

Mystical thinkers in general have been more mindful of the reality of experiential sequence in religious experience. Christian evangelists sometimes overlook the necessity of that experiential sequence when they offer to atheists, agnostics and non-Christians a whole jumble of doctrines of eschatology, Fall, Sin, Predestination, Unity of Trinity, New Adam and the like, the infinite implications of which depend on an ordered sequence of experience. In Christian experience the first conviction is a conviction about the exclusive worship-ability of the *man* Jesus. The Christian Church has rightly regarded the perfect humanity of Jesus as precious as His divinity. In private experience, anyone who responds to the Gospels, begins by saying to himself, "This *man* Jesus is the only truly worshipable person. If the Creator of the Universe is other than this man, then this man Jesus is superior to that Creator." At this commencing

point of a submission to Jesus, the submitting soul may not realise the identity of the man Jesus with the divine Creator. But as a *transition* from atheism to belief in a Worshipable Being, this must not be condemned as heresy. Let the new initiate cultivate worship of the worshipable *man* Jesus privately, and from this very soon will be born the belief in the identity of the man Jesus with the Creator of the heavens and the earth. Early Christianity reached this doctrine of fullest identity through such heresies. In a concentrated way individual souls go through similar stages.

The modern man runs away from religion because he is not offered the loving disposition of Jesus Christ as the primary experience and the gateway. He is told that to be Christian he must *begin* by accepting several rigidly fixed and rigidly articulated articles of long creeds all at once. The message is given with little indication of the centrality or marginality of doctrines.

Let us not misunderstand. There are areas in religion which call for rationality and formulation. But the response to God's love in Jesus is not one for which one must find a logical argument first. Rationalism around an emotion can liquidate that emotion. It is therefore a help when applied against unhealthy emotion, but it is a detriment when regarded as an alternative to the experience of love.

A tribute is due here to those modern theologians who have re-defined the phenomena of myth, miracle and revelation. They have thus re-established the dignity of the Bible in the hearts of many. But let us be fair and say also that these redefinitions are inaccessible to a great mass of Christians educated in positive sciences. The reason for this inaccessibility is that a thorough and mature grasp of these redefinitions requires a tremendous theological training. But scientific laymen have little time. The smatterings of theology which they gather here and there, fail to satisfy them for the simple reason that as *smatterings* they leave an impression of inferiority to the refined systems of sciences which they have learnt more assiduously.

The creativity of a theology should be judged by the quality of that which reaches the common man of the generation.

The situation has been made difficult by the fact that never before in human history, have huge numbers of men been so highly educated and the diluted forms in which theology filtered down to them were not set against any better knowledge which they had developed in non-theological fields.

Our conclusion must be that Christian theology now should concentrate on that aspect of the Christian faith which moves human hearts without depending on elaborate rational systems. And that aspect is the experience of the unsurpassed and perfect love of Jesus for mankind.¹

With aspirations to cultivate the genuine Christian mood of love, sacrifice, thankfulness, forbearance and forgiveness, a Christian scientist may fearlessly launch into the studies of non-Christian faiths and communities, and dig new grounds. The actual technique of 'digging' is not affected by one's being a Christian or a Hindu or a Jew. The scientific demonstration of Relativity did not demand a Jewish outlook on life on the part of Einstein. The scientific method has become autonomous.

* * * * *

Some significance of objectivistic work by Western scholarship in non-Christian religion may be illustrated by examples of Christian scholarship in the Islamic field.

A huge library can be built by collecting all the editions, translations and appraisals of Muslim classics brought out by Western scholars (including of course many eminent Jews). Nearly three centuries of patient work enabled them to reach a stage where preparation of a five volumes' encyclopaedia of Islam was undertaken by them in 1913. It took 25 years to be complete. The name of my father's illustrious teacher, Prof. E. G. Browne of Cambridge University is conspicuous by its absence from among writers who contributed, though the time of compilation of the encyclopaedia was one when Prof. Browne was in his prime. He felt that such an undertaking was premature for the Islamic field. He was free to make his decision, but that encyclopaedia would have deserved to

¹The welcome autonomy of scientific method from revelation has brought about one unnecessary development: Countless scientists of the modern age have failed to think of consecrating their scientific works by the remembrance of God. Have you come across masterpieces of researches in physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, medicine, anthropology, politics and so on, carrying the name of the Lord on the title pages? Many of the scientists producing those researches are profoundly committed Christians. But how will their admirers know this! Scientists themselves can best check the arrogance that may result from scientific accomplishment.

be called great indeed even if it had not been a pioneer undertaking.¹

Through its translations the historical method is being introduced subtly in Muslim lands. It is chiefly the articles relating to Muslim *theology* in this encyclopaedia, which in their *historical narrative form* should give a new and shaking impulse to the doctors of Islam.² It is this part of the encyclopaedia which must play a dynamic role in the future formulation of Muslim theology. Muslims have only recently received the shock of the breakdown of the Canon Law (Sharī'at) of Islam in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Egypt. This should lead logically to a shift of Muslim interest from law to theology if they wish Islam's survival.

Protestant Christian scholarship on the other hand can look back to a century of encyclopaedic venture. The outcome of this profuse narrative treatment of the faith was demanded by the more dynamic Protestant attitudes. Christians have suffered the turmoils of self-examination for a century which offered more questions than answers.

Such dynamic encyclopaedic undertaking defeats narrow fundamentalism and spreads tolerance by establishing the principle of flow and growth and adaptation in religious tradition. The narrative way of looking at things has crept even into more scientific secular dictionaries of European languages where the meanings of words are treated historically. This was the only way of making the masses of the Christian world historically minded. There is no reason why there should be different means to make the Muslims historically minded.

Such historical training of a religious community necessitates a basic reformulation of the entire theology. Without such prolonged training, meaningful redefinitions of myth, miracle and revelation are not acceptable to the members of that community.

Let us consider how Muslim attitudes to their sacred literature

¹However, Prof. Browne's 'perfectionism' in the matter was not irrelevant. The kind of specialists that are available in Christian scholarship for writing specialised articles are not always easily available among the limited team of Islamicists in the West in the course of one generation. This led in the case of the Encyclopaedia of Islam to assignment sometimes of certain articles to writers which were extremely marginal if not external to their own specialised fields. The same limitation applies to the assignment of non-Christian articles in Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Yet, let us emphasise that both the encyclopaedias are great beginnings. The Encyclopaedia of Islam is now appearing in its revised edition. Its first edition is being rendered into Arabic, Persian, Urdu and Turkish respectively in the Muslim lands of Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey under state-sponsorships.

²These articles have been gleaned and published by Brill's as the *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

may change with the introduction of critical methods. Classical Islam was interested in the "occasion of descent" of each and every verse of the Qur'an. However, with the decline of scholarly activity in Islam, discussions about the chronology of verses died and the Qur'an began to be treated completely ecstatically. In contemporary Muslim scholarship there is much blissful unconcern over the chronology of Qur'anic contents. The great German scholar Nöldeke scrutinised classical treatments of the subject and established the chronological order of chapters which has been the standard order generally accepted by scientific scholarship in the West.

Muslim scholarship today is almost completely oblivious of the issues in this chronological problem. There are two reasons for the hesitation to re-open the subject: (1) This will be a bothersome affair. (2) Should Muslim scholars proceed by citing Nöldeke's conclusions? No. This would be acceptance of a non-Muslim's opinion. Should they then adopt Nöldeke's opinion without citing him? No. This would be plagiarism. The best course is to dismiss the whole matter.

But sooner or later, Nöldeke will be translated into Muslim languages. This is inevitable. Then Nöldeke's work will play its role in the Muslim reformulation of ideas around revelation. It will result in an activist conception of revelation, not in terms of Muḥammad's being a mechanical microphone through which his God transmitted, but in terms of Muḥammad's being inspired in a more general way.

Take again the work of Goldziher on Ḥadīth, the massive literature supposed to be the record of Muḥammad's deeds and non-revelatory utterances. The bulk of this literature is fabricated, though from motives not wholly unworthy. The dilemma of the genuineness or forgery led Muslims to mistrust the whole body of this literature and to dismiss it. This has horribly weakened their Qur'anic scholarship, for the exegesis of ambiguous passages of the Qur'an is dependent upon Ḥadīth literature. Goldziher showed by critical demonstration that Ḥadīth is the richest source of information on the development of theology and jurisprudence in early Islam. Critical method will re-instate Ḥadīth in the eyes of the Muslims. This will bring about a tremendous change in Muslim theology.

The Arabic English Lexicon of E. W. Lane, with its historical handling of words, is another great work which will play a great role in the reconstruction of Muslim theology.

Thus we must understand that objectivistic research is proving


and will prove to be the most influential factor in the future development of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and other religions.

Historical criticism can build bridges between religious islands. I was thrilled last year to read the title of Dean Alexander Purdy's book *Jew and Greek, Tutors unto Christ*, which implies that the God-Incarnate was subject to temporal laws and was 'tutored' by men. But if a Muslim today wrote a book entitled *Jew and Christian, Tutors unto Muḥammad*, he would probably be killed. For uncritical fundamentalism would declaim that none but Allāh was Muḥammad's tutor. Let us hope the day will come when Muslims will be able to write such books. Whether this will be accomplished without martyrdom within Islam is yet to be seen.

Now when Christian theology has been considerably restated under the impact of historical method, a new avenue of objectivistic research has opened before Christian scholars in the field of non-Christian religions. That research is one aiming at predicting what kind of forms non-Christian theologies will assume under the impact of historical criticism. This is a venture with tremendous opportunity. Together with their efforts of evangelism, the Christians must never overlook their responsibility to take part, as far as possible, in influencing non-Christian religious communities to become more tolerant, loving and compatible communities in the world. With the opportunities they have, Christian nations must help non-Christians in formulating tolerant theologies to the advantage of a more loving world.

It will take fewer words to describe the theological approach to Urdu literature and Pakistani history. As elsewhere in non-Christian religions, the Christian must look for the sparks of the *Logos* which brings the gifts of nobler aspirations among enthused seekers of truth. It must recognize and bring out in commentary those tendencies in the religious traditions of these non-Christian faiths that believe in love and forgiveness rather than hatred and revenge, and those tendencies of emancipation which believe in obedience to conscience instructed by love rather than blind fidelity to a traditional code. In the fragmentary account of Islamic theology and tradition we have noticed the Shī'a desire to worship a Just God who is on the side of the suffering ones. In the Ṣūfī or the mystical tradition of Islam we have noticed the initiative of those who revolted against mechanical ritual and a highly transcendental theology and against mechanised and hypocritical ethics. We have

noticed Abū Ḥanifa's desire for expression of frankness. It is such noble revolts which the Christian theologian must recognize and praise as the gifts of the *Logos*, gifts which get transformed into infinitely richer gifts of the Holy Spirit for those who read and respond to the Gospel.



Elmer H. Douglas and Edwin E. Calverley
(Photograph by *The Hartford Courant*)

“THE MUSLIM WORLD” AFTER FIFTY YEARS

Elmer H. Douglas

Dr. Elmer H. Douglas is Associate Professor of Arabic and Islamics at the Hartford Seminary Foundation, and Editor of *The Muslim World*.

The contributor of an article submitted for publication recently had this to say by way of explanation: “I like the stimulating company of your other contributors and their articles.”

Similarly the company of the contributors of *The Hartford Quarterly* is agreeable and reassuring, for while undoubtedly *Quarterly* readers consume with gusto those pages that are directly related to campus intellectual life, it cannot be readily assumed that the same readers habitually examine the articles of *The Muslim World*, a Christian journal devoted particularly to Islamic studies. This conjecture is made in spite of the fact that *The Muslim World* has been a publication of the Hartford Seminary Foundation since July 1937.

If somewhat boastfully it can be said that *The Muslim World* has a select clientele, the reason may be found in its distinctive nature. It is a quarterly review of the history, culture and religious life of the Muslim people, its purpose being to promote the welfare of the Muslims with special regard to the intellectual and religious life. It proposes to do this by presenting material that fosters a “Christian understanding of Islam and a Muslim awareness of Christ,” as stated on its cover.

Its standards are scholarly and objective accuracy, friendly concern, and sincere good will.

Its objectives, as stated by the late Dr. D. B. Macdonald in his

editorial of the January 1938 issue, still holds. He said, in part, "The ultimate object of this Quarterly is still to draw the hearts and minds of Moslems to the great fact of Christ and to His work in and for the world. Whatever is of importance to the World of Islam is still our subject. The spiritual welfare of Moslems is still our object. Good-will toward all is still our method."

The Muslim World approaches the task of promoting mutual understanding in Muslim-Christian relations by the publication of articles, information and book reviews prepared by competent writers of several faiths, and calling attention to periodical articles in other journals dealing with Islam. It seeks to present to readers of all faiths a true and adequate picture of Islam as it frankly attempts to make known Christian thought. It has no political objective. Its Christian influence is on a voluntary basis, with no compulsion or irreligious inducement, and with respect for the sincere opinions of others.

Historically *The Muslim World* has just rounded out a half-century. It was founded in 1911 by the late Dr. Samuel M. Zwemer, pioneer missionary in Arabia, who remained its editor until the responsibility for its publication was undertaken by the Hartford Seminary Foundation in 1937. In that year Dr. Zwemer became coeditor with Dr. Edwin E. Calverley who was then Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies in this institution, after having likewise served as missionary in Arabia. This coeditorship continued through the April issue of 1947. From July of that year until July of 1952 Dr. Calverley remained sole editor. From 1952 through April 1960 Dr. Calverley coedited the review with Dr. Kenneth Cragg who had come to the Foundation to occupy the chair of Arabic and Islamics in 1950. From July 1960 and thereafter Dr. Calverley has given editorial assistance to the present writer. These men have set and maintained standards of Christian scholarship which have assured to *The Muslim World* a recognized place of merit in the field of periodical literature.

The Muslim World has always, in the view of its editors and others, filled a particular need and served a unique purpose. When Dr. Zwemer founded the review under the title *The Moslem World*, he acknowledged the abundance of literature on Islam then available in various languages. In his inaugural editorial of January 1911 he mentioned particularly *Der Islam*, a review "devoted to the

scientific study of Islam," its first issue having appeared in 1910, and the *Revue du Monde Musulman*, the publication of which had begun in 1907. While he recognized that the latter was "invaluable to the student of Islam, not only because of its leading articles, but more particularly on account of its careful review of the Moslem press," he also pointed out that "its standpoint is purely scientific and wholly neutral as regards the Christian faith."

Perhaps the last phrase quoted, "as regards the Christian faith," provides the clue to Dr. Zwemer's prime objective. He was a Christian missionary at heart, and he wanted to make the truth of Christ known to the world of Islam. "The existence of all this literature," he wrote, "and the revival of interest in the great problem of Islam shown by the publication of these reviews . . . only emphasize the opportunity and the place for an English quarterly review of current events, literature, and thought among Mohammedans as they affect the Church of Christ and its missionary programme. If the Churches of Christendom are to reach the Moslem world with the Gospel, they must know of it and know it."

With this Christ-relatedness of Islamic studies there was present, in the mind of the founder, the imperative of high scholarly standards, the maintenance of which would receive the commendation of Muslim and Christian alike.

The need that was felt for such a journal a half-century ago has not diminished with time. The number of books and articles on Islam has enormously increased. Publications of scholars of other nations (Dutch, German, French, British, Italian, Spanish) and of Muslims have been translated or republished in America. During the last one hundred years there has been an enormous increase in factual knowledge of Islam by non-Muslims, and during the past fifty years a much more profound and accurate understanding of the essentials of Islam, at least in academic circles. There is still a great need for the acquisition of correct information on the part of the masses of the people, and for a dispelling of erroneous notions by both Christians and Muslims. This increase of knowledge has resulted in a somewhat more sympathetic appreciation of Islam and of the Muslim people.

Significant for America's understanding of Islam is the opening of the mosque in Washington as a cultural center, the establishment of mosques in various regions (see our article by the Rev. C.

Umhau Wolf, "Muslims in the American Mid-West," Jan. 1960), the immigration of Muslims into the United States, the presence of Muslim students in our universities. All these are serving to make Americans aware of the presence of Islam in the United States and in the world.

The affiliation of Muslim countries with the United Nations has enhanced the importance of Muslims and their religion in the eyes of Americans.

The setting up of courses and departments offering instruction in the languages and culture of Muslim peoples in many universities of the United States is of deep significance.

Sir H. A. R. Gibb, Professor at Harvard University, wrote in the Foreword of his book *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago, 1947, p. viii): "The fullest documentation (i.e. about Islam) is to be found in the quarterly issues of *The Moslem World* since 1910. Though its standpoint and outlook are uncompromisingly missionary, it is a part of the modern missionary's technique to acquire a much deeper understanding of other religions than his predecessors displayed. Not all its contributors reach the high standard set by D. B. Macdonald, but a large proportion of its articles at least reflects current phases of Muslim religious thought. Other missionary journals add little to the materials contained in the *Moslem World*."

Occasional testimonies from readers of *The Muslim World* actually living in Muslim lands reveal its vital role. One correspondent recently wrote: "Time will not allow me to comment at length on the material of *The Muslim World*, but let me say that we always look forward to its arrival. As you can well remember, there are many times when one gets terrifically dry out here and the stimulation of some of the articles is a 'lifesend' to us. I usually do not go through them all, but in every issue I have found at least four articles that have especially helped and guided . . . We usually start by reading the editorial, and then we switch to the Notes of the Quarter, and then the book reviews, and then, starting at the back, work into the issue. True Arab style!"

Another sympathetic reader recently expressed in writing his appreciation of an "editorial with its usual fine message for both Muslims and Christians." Referring to the writings of the present editor's predecessor, he suggested that these editorials be gathered into a published volume which "would be just the thing as a gift

to put into the hands of Muslim friends . . . These editorial essays draw the readers' attention to the Qur'an and to the Bible; they are of optimum length; they cover a wide area of spiritual concerns; and they give sympathetic attention to the Christian message in its relevance to Muslim thinking."

More than fifty per cent of *Muslim World* subscribers are outside the United States. Among them are university libraries, embassies, cultural centers.

Past issues contain articles of permanent value. The student will find studies on the Qur'an, Muslim theology, Islamic philosophy, mysticism, Muslim law, life in Muslim lands, education, biographies. Also may be found articles on the Church, the Bible, modern Arabic literature, social reform, medicine, at least one article each on baseball, Omar Khayyam and Martin Luther.

Some of the titles of articles that will appear in the October 1961 issue are: "A Sufi Psychological Treatise"; "Muslim-Christian Relationships"; "Jerusalem Byways of Memory"; "Medieval Christian Tolerance and the Muslim World"; "Early Muslim-Western Education in West Africa"; and a report on current debates in the United Nations on Religious Freedom.

Those responsible for *The Muslim World* believe that it has a ministry to fulfill among Christians and Muslims, one that is dependent on respect for the truth and a desire for mutual understanding, and motivated by the imperative of Christian charity. As it enters upon its second half-century it is with a firm resolve to maintain its traditional high standards of scholarship with devotion to the cause for which it was founded. It will continue to cherish the help and interest of its many friends at home and throughout the world.



Kennedy School of Missions, Hartford Seminary Foundation

THE KENNEDY SCHOOL OF MISSIONS: THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

Flola Shepard

Miss Flola Shepard is Associate Professor of Linguistics in the Hartford Seminary Foundation.

The historical sketch of the Kennedy School of Missions published each year in the catalogue of The Hartford Seminary Foundation has reminded us of our debt to Mrs. Emma Baker Kennedy whose generous endowment to the school fifty years ago is a memorial to her husband, the late John Stewart Kennedy. It is fitting that a sketch in summary of the history of the last twenty-five years of the Kennedy School of Missions should again acknowledge that original debt and again express appreciation for the encouragement which Mrs. Kennedy gave to the broader and deeper training for missionaries.

Mrs. Emma Baker Kennedy also set up a fund from which the income is to help missionary students in need. Another fund was established by Charles Edward Prior in memory of his wife, Mary Eleanor Prior. Mrs. Martha A. Walter created the Howard Arnold Walter Fund to aid students from India who will return to evangelical work there. The Mary Wolcott Barstow Memorial Fund was established to provide financial help for students in preparation for service abroad. The Steggerda Scholarship, the Henry Barrows Reed Scholarship, the Capen Fund, the Schwenkfelder Scholarship have been gratefully added to the list of grants-in-aid. Appointees and sometimes candidates have been sent for training and

supported by their Mission Board. But the Kennedy School of Missions has had, and has many students who give promise of ability to perform valuable service and who are not supported by a Mission Board. Often such students need financial help. The grants-in-aid have proved most valuable. Larger amounts are needed to assist advanced students from other countries.

In the Madras and post-Madras conferences, the emphases were accepted which had been laid by the Kennedy School of Missions at its foundation. This meant the recognition of its basic principles and presented a tremendous challenge ever to improve techniques. But the trained world Christian leadership could not always carry on where it would, in the uncertainty of the war years, when travels abroad were uncertain and visas delayed or refused. Growing awareness of the closing in of distances brought shifts in area needs. As the gates shut in front of the Far East, the Missions Boards were able to send a greater number of appointees to India, to Africa and to Latin America. When, by 1954, it became difficult for missionaries to be admitted to India, more again could be directed to Africa and the preparation for Southeast Asia could begin to receive the attention long overdue.

World conditions made necessary both enlarging and intensifying the program of area studies. The dedication to the Missionary ideal had to be supplemented not only by knowledge of areas as they were and as they seemed to be evolving but by a readiness to accept an outlook tomorrow which could not be foreseen today. The Faculty of the School of Missions could less than ever before rely upon a stockpile of previously accumulated information. More travelling must be done in the areas within the program, more conferences with nationals and other informants must be held, more current publications must be read, more language background must be developed. The demands were overwhelming. It was the Carnegie Corporation of New York that made them possible of fulfillment by a grant, in 1952, of \$15,000 a year for the following five years, and an increased grant, in 1957, of \$24,000 a year for the next five years.

With the aid provided by the Carnegie Grant it was possible to arrange four sabbatical field trips between 1952 and 1958. Dr. Parsons went to Africa to study at first-hand the work of former students in six remote villages. He met and discussed with ninety-

two former students of the Foundation. Dr. Hohlfeld did literacy work in Iran, under the Near East Foundation. Dr. Pitt returned to India to study developments both inside and outside the Christian movement and to add to his materials on the communication of culture through the Fine Arts. Dr. Leser travelled beyond the borders of Northwest Africa, with which he was already well acquainted, to Tanganyika and to the northwest Belgian Congo, with short stops in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Belgian Congo, Union of South Africa. He learned about farm methods by laboring on the farm, and about educational problems by observing them and discussing with teachers and families.

Dr. Irven Paul made a study tour of changes and work in progress in eleven countries of Central and South America and met former students who have been preaching, teaching, translating and handling language data.

Six strenuous and stimulating, information-packed conferences have been held, again with aid from the Carnegie Grant: in May 1952, "Islam at Mid-Century"; in May 1953, "Statesmanship in Africa—A Present-Day Demand Upon the Christian Movement"; in May 1954, "Americans in India"; in May 1955, "Toward an Understanding of Latin America"; in May 1957, "A Colloquium on Interreligious Relationships Today"; in October 1959, "The Interrelationships of Philosophy and Theology and Their Relevance to the Cultures of Latin America." The conferences brought together a large group of informed and interested participants. Five of the papers on Statesmanship in Africa and reports on "Toward an Understanding of Latin America" and "A Colloquium on Interreligious Relationships Today" were published in "Civilizations," a publication of the International Institute for Differing Civilizations in Belgium. The papers on "The Interrelationships of Philosophy and Their Relevance to the Cultures of Latin America" were published in *Nueva Democracia* which distributed reprints to areas in Latin America where the Colloquium was to be continued.

Provided for by the second Carnegie Grant, the area program for Southeast Asia was set up in 1957. For two years, one full-time professor with some assistance from nationals and missionaries on furlough planned and taught the courses. Since then the Cultural

Study has been given in a series of meetings during the year, seven professors from Yale University offering the program.

All of the area studies were strengthened by the Carnegie Grant which provided for teaching fellows in four departments, namely, Arabic and Islamics, India, Africa and Anthropology. These were nationals from Egypt and Syria; from India and Pakistan; from the Union of South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia. The overseas participants have been making an invaluable contribution to studies in linguistics. They, and with them missionary linguists on furlough, have served as informants to students and Faculty.

The Kennedy School of Missions came in 1955 into its own hall and notes daily expression of gratitude to Mrs. Gillett whose initial gift in memory of Arthur Lincoln Gillett set up the fund which was to make possible the completion of Gillett Hall. Here, for the first time, the Soundsciber equipment which Mr. G. Walton Bissell had contributed in 1952 toward the development of different aspects of language work, was settled in its own quarters. Each semester some new recording or listening device, some new tapes, must be brought in and some replacement must be made, for the Bissell Linguistics Laboratory is in use from the time of the morning opening to the evening closing of the doors of Gillett Hall.

The great room on the second floor serves as an auditorium for lectures, in emergencies as a class-room, and, with chairs removed, as a museum on the occasions when it is possible to bring our art objects out of the storage places and set up an exhibition.

Opportunities besides those of the sabbatical trips have been provided for work in the field. Encouraged by the scholarly interest of Dr. Paul Fejos and with a grant from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, of which Dr. Fejos is President, Dr. Leser went, in 1955, to Germany to participate in the international sessions on Agrarian Anthropology, at the German Academy of Sciences. Dr. Parsons received a Fulbright award to direct for 1955-1956 a research project at Achimota, then Gold Coast. Dr. Gleason, under the Rockefeller Foundation, taught linguistics at Deccan College in Poona, India from 1956 to 1958.

An important step has been taken in setting beside the program of required studies an elective in Ethnomusicology. The growing appreciation of art patterns which once seemed strange has opened the way to a whole realm of understanding and contact. Dr. Pitt

has organized the course and has supplemented his own presentation of materials with that of specialists in different phases or areas of Ethnomusicology whom he has brought to the campus.

Other institutions have by now introduced Area Studies and Practical Linguistics. Some of the Mission Boards have opened their own training schools. The Kennedy School of Missions still remains the only interdenominational and international graduate school for the preparation of missionaries and for the advanced work of missionaries on furlough.

